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Alternative Career Resolution: An 
Essay on the Removal of Federal 
Judges* 
BY STEPHEN B. BURBANK** 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a critical time for the federal j udiciary and hence for 
all of us . For the first time in fifty years , the House has im­
peached , and the Senate has removed a federal judge, Harry 
Claiborne .' A subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee 
* Copyright 1 988 by Stephen B. Burbank.  
* *  Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B.  1 968, J.D. 1 973 , Harvard 
University. A shorter version of this Essay was presented at the Kentucky Law Journal's 
Symposium on Judicial Discipline and Impeachment on October 12 ,  1987, at the Univer­
sity of Kentucky College of Law. Edward Grosz and Robert Hoyt, class of 1 989, provided 
excellent research assistance. 
' United States District Judge Harry Claiborne was impeached by the House of 
Representatives on July 22, 1 986, 1 32 CoNG.  REc. H47 10-21 (daily ed. July 22, 1 986), 
and removed from office by the Senate on October 9, 1 986. 1 32 CONG. REc. S 1 5 ,759-62 
(daily ed. Oct . 9, 1 986). The last previous impeachment of a federal judge, or any other 
person holding federal office, was that of United States District Judge Halsted Ritter in 
1 936.  80 CoNG. REc. 3066-92 ( 1936). Ritter was removed from office in the same year. 
80 CoNG. REc. 5602-08 ( 1 936). 
According to the Constitution: 
The House of Representatives shall . . .  have the sole Power of Im­
peachment. 
U.S .  CoNST. art. I, § 2, cl . 5 .  
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When 
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the 
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And 
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the 
Members present. 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of 
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted 
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and 
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is presently investigating a second federal judge , Alcee Hastings , 
whose impeachment is called for by a resolution introduced last 
year . 2 A third federal j udge , Walter Nixon, whose criminal con­
viction was affirmed on appeal ,3 has followed Claiborne's ex­
ample by refusing to resign , and a resolution calling for his 
impeachment was recently referred to another subcommittee .4 
There has been a flurry of legislative activity in response to 
these developments . Startled by the need to use the impeachment 
process against J udge Claiborne , a convicted felon who had 
exhausted appeals , and before that process had been completed , 
legislators in the House and Senate introduced resolutions pro­
posing constitutional amendments that would m ake removal au­
tomatic in such cases .5  When the process had run its course and 
in contemplation of a more difficult case, another senator pro­
posed a broader constitutional amendment . 6 
Punishment, according to Law . 
!d. at § 3 ,  cl . 6-7 .  
The President , Vice President, and all civil Officers of  the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction 
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors . 
!d. at art. II ,  § 4 .  
2 See H.R.  Res. 128 ,  1 00th Cong . ,  1 st Sess . ( 1 987) (resolution impeaching United 
States District Judge Alcee Hastings); 1 3 3  CoNG. REc.  H 1 506, 1 5 1 4  (daily ed. Mar. 23 , 
1 987). 
3 See United States v .  Nixon, 827 F.2d 10 19  (5th Cir. 1 987),  cert. denied, 1 08 S .  
Ct . 749 ( 1 988). 
• The day after the Supreme Court denied review of his conviction for perjury, 
see supra note 3 ,  Judge Walter Nixon announced that he would not resign. See Rodino 
Announces Impeachment Inquiry (March 17 ,  1 988) (news release) (copy available from 
author). A resolution impeaching him was introduced on March 1 7, 1 988 ,  H . R .  Res . 407 , 
1 00th Cong. ,  2d Sess .  ( 1 988), and it was referred to the Subcommittee on Civil and 
Constitutional Rights .  See Rodino Announces Impeachment Inquiry, supra. 
5 See H.R.J .  Res . 658,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess. ( 1 986) ; H . R . J .  Res . 665 , 99th Cong. ,  
2 d  Sess. ( 1 986); S .J .  Res . 364, 99th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess . ( 1 986); S . J .  Res. 370, 99th Cong . ,  
2 d  Sess . ( 1 986) . For a n  analysis o f  the Senate resolutions, see Hearing o n  S. J. Res. 364 
& S.J. Res. 3 70 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 99th Cong. ,  2d Sess .  30-39 ( 1 986) [hereinafter Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S.J. 
Res. 370] (statement of Stephen B. Burbank). Cf H.R.J .  Res . 680, 99th Cong. ,  2d Sess. 
( 1986) (proposing constitutional amendment empowering Congress to provide by law for 
diminution of salary of federal judge convicted of felony) . 
6 See S .J .  Res . 1 1 3 ,  lOOth Cong. ,  1 st Sess .  ( 1 987). S . J .  Res . 370,  supra note 5 ,  
introduced by Senator DeConcini in 1 986, included a broader proposal as well as a 
proposal for automatic forfeiture of office upon conviction of a felony and exhaustion 
of direct appeals. See infra note 9; see also H .R . J .  Res . 364 ,  1 00th Cong . ,  2d Sess . 
( 1 988). 
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At the same time that federal judges were involved m cnm­
inal proceedings , and when impeachment proceedings were in 
prospect , legislators were considering experience under 1980 leg­
islation that , for the first time, provided a statutory supplement 
to the arrangements prescribed by the Constitution .  7 Although 
that consideration included oversight hearings intended to be 
helpful to the judges in meeting their responsibilities under this 
legislation, 8 it also included a proposal to scrap the 1 980 scheme 
in favor of a constitutional blank check to Congress because of 
the alleged "inactivity" of the judges .9  
This is hardly the first time that the means devised by the 
framers to preserve the independence of federal judges have 
been at risk . Thomas Jefferson , at one time an advocate of  
judicial independence, 10 came to  view the question differently 
and apparently hoped to use the impeachment process to remove 
federalist justices from the Supreme Court . His plan came a 
cropper with the Senate's  failure to convict Justice Samuel 
Chase. 1 1 The independence of federal judges was again under 
attack early in this century. The recall of judges was as dear to 
7 Pub . L .  No . 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 ( 1980) (effective Oct. 1 ,  1 98 1 ) .  The Act's 
disciplinary procedures are contained id. at § 3, 94 Stat . 203 5 ,  2036-40 (codified at 28 
U .S .C . § 372(c) (1982)) . See generally Burbank,  Procedural Rulemaking Under the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability A ct of 1980, 1 3 1  U .  PA. L .  REv. 
283 ( 1 982-83).  
8 See Oversight Hearing on Federal Judicial Branch Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the A dmin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 
99th Cong . ,  1 st Sess . ( 1 985) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] . 
9 1 32  CoNG.  REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1 986) (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
Senator DeConcini's remarks were made in connection with S .J .  Res . 370, supra note 5 ,  
which included the following proposed constitutional amendment: 
The Congress shall have the power by appropriate legislation to set standards 
and guidelines by which the Supreme Court may discipline judges appointed 
pursuant to Article III who bring disrepute on the Federal Courts or the 
administration of justice by the courts . Such discipline may include removal 
from office and diminution of compensation. 
10 See, e.g., G. HASKINS & H. JoHNSON, HISTORY OF THE SuPREME CouRT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1 80 1 - 1 5 ,  at 205-45 ( 1 98 1 ) ;  
Stevens, Reflections on the Removal of Sitting Judges, 13  STETSON L.  REv. 2 1 5 ,  2 1 8- 1 9  
( 1 983-84) . 
" See, e.g. , P .  HoFFER & N. Huu, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1 635- 1 805 ,  at 1 8 1-
90,  228-55 ( 1 984); B!ackmar, On the Removal of Judges: The Impeachment Trial of 
Samuel Chase, 48 J .  AM. JuDICATURE Soc'y 1 83 ( 1964-65); Stevens, supra note 10,  at 
2 1 8-20; Swindler, High Court of Congress: Impeachment Trials, 1 797-1936, 60 A.B.A.  
J .  420, 42 1 -24 ( 1 974) . 
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Theodore Roosevelt as i t  was repellent to William Howard Taft. 12 
At least one scholar has viewed the removal of Judge Archbald 
in 1913 as in part a response to the recall movement . 13 Finally,  
although this is hardly an exhaustive account , we may remember 
"Impeach Earl Warren" billboards . 14 We may not remember,  
however , that Justice Douglas was put to considerable trouble 
in averting impeachment in 1970. 15 
Nor is this the first time that unhappiness with the consti­
tutional arrangements for removal of federal judges has led to 
congressional advocacy of alternatives. On the contrary , consti­
tutional amendments have been proposed in Congress since early 
in our history .16 In the aftermath of the removal of Judge 
Halsted Ritter in 1936,17 serious attention was given to  statutory 
proposals that included and foundered on provisions authorizing 
removal by alternative means . 1 8  Similar proposals were revived 
in response to publicity surrounding a few federal j udges in the 
1960s , and , in a public well poisoned by Watergate ,  such pro­
posals became a maj or item on the congressional agenda in the 
mid-1970s . 19 For present purposes , the remarkable fact is not 
that Congress managed to enact compromise legislation in 1980 
but that , before the legislation became effective and ever since 
that time, legislators have introduced bills and resolutions the 
" See, e.g., Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 1 3 5  U. PA. L .  REv. 909, 955 ( 1 986-87) . 
13 See Ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachment Since 1 903, 
23 MINN. L .  REv. 1 85 ,  1 92-93 ( 193 8-39); cf Peterson, Recall of Judges and Impeachment, 
86 CENT. L . J .  242, 245 ( 1 9 1 8) ("The movement for the recall of judges is largely based 
on dissatisfaction with the present system of impeachment . "). 
14 See Blackmar, supra note 1 1 , at 1 83 .  
1 '  See SPECIAL SuBCOMM. ON H .R .  REs. 920 OF THE HousE CoMM. ON T HE  JuDICIARY, 
FINAL REPORT ON AssociATE JusTICE WILLIAM 0. DouGLAS, 9 1 st Cong . ,  2d Sess . ( 1 970). 
Appendix D to this report , occupying one hundred pages, contains the fact brief and a 
reply memorandum filed by Simon Rifkind, Justice Douglas' attorney. 
16 For example, on February 7, 1 806 , Representative Randolph introduced a reso­
lution calling for a constitutional amendment to provide for removal by address . See 9 
ANNALS OF CONG. 446 ( 1 806) ; see also J. BORKIN, THE CoRRUPT JUDGE 1 95-96 ( 1 962) 
(the date given by Borkin for the Eighth Congress is incorrect) ; Bingham, A Proposed 
Constitutional A mendment Regarding Impeachment Proceedings, 65 U . S . L .  REv. 323 
( 1 93 1 )  (the author was a senator). 
17 See supra note 1 .  
18 See Burbank,  supra note 7 ,  at 291 -92 n .24; Otis, A Proposed Tribunal: Is It 
Constitutional?, 7 U. KAN. Crn L .  REv. 1 ( 1 938) .  
19 See Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 291-94. 
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effect if not the purpose of which would have been to undo 
those hard-won compromises.20 
Nor is this the first time that proposals for wholesale change 
have been introduced without serious attention to adjustments 
in current arrangements . That too has been the norm. The 
Senate's rules governing removal trials have changed very little 
since the trial of President Andrew Johnson in 1 868 .21 A 1 935 
'° For proposed legislation, see H.R. 994, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 3018, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202 (1982); Burbank, supra note 7, at 347 n.276. 
The number and character of proposed constitutional amendments affecting judicial 
tenure that have been introduced since 1980 are stunning. They may be grouped roughly 
as follows: (1) retention election: H.R.J. Res. 451, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (every 6 
years); (2) limited term and/or limited tenure: H.R.J. Res. 325, lOOth Cong., 1st. Sess. 
(1987) (6 year terms; 12 year limit); H.R.J. Res. 71, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (10 
years during any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 30, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years 
during any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 144, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (10 years during 
any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 90, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (8 years); H.R.J. Res. 
51, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10 years during any 12 year period); H.R.J. Res. 8, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (6 year terms; 12 year limit); S.J. Res. 24, 97th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1981) (10 years but reappointment permitted to another court); (3) limited term 
unless Senate consents to continuance in office: H.R.J. Res. 168, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1987) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 184, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 
628, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (6 years); H.R.J. Res. 264, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) 
(10 years); H.R.J. Res. 490, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 427, 
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (6 years); (4) limited term unless President nominates and 
Senate consents to continuance in office: H.R.J. Res. 177, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) 
(Supreme Court Justices to serve 15 year terms but eligible for reappointment); H.R.J. 
Res. 557, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Supreme Court Justices to serve 15 year terms but 
eligible for reappointment); H.R.J. Res. 103, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); S.J. 
Res. 30, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 374, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1983) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 252, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (10 years); S.J. Res. 39, 
98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (10 years); H.R.J. Res. 60, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10 
years); S.J. Res. 21, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (10 years); (5) limited term and/or age 
restrictions: H.R.J. Res. 419, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (10 year term and age limit of 
70 for judges of inferior courts; no appointment to any federal court after attaining 60); 
(6) good behavior but removal by Senate resolution: H.R.J. Res. 56, 99th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1985) (during lOth year of any 10 year period); H.R.J. Res. 17, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1983) (during lOth year of any 10 year period); H.R.J. Res. 570, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1982) (during lOth year of any 10 year period). 
For other proposed constitutional amendments regarding tenure, see supra notes 5-
6 and accompanying text. For another method of attack on the federal judiciary, see 
Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch": The Tradition of A ttack on 
Judicial Po wer, 59 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 252 (1984) (attempts to limit the jurisdiction of federal 
courts). 
" See Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials: Hearings 
Before the Comm. on Rules and A dministration, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 171 (1974) [here­
inafter Senate Rules] (letter from Hon. Mike Mansfield); Futterman, The Rules of 
Impeachment, 24 K.AN. L .  REv. 105, 105 (1975-76). 
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amendment authorizing evidence-taking by a committee ,22 which 
had been advocated as early as 1904,23 was not availed of  in the 
trial of Judge Ritter in 1936 ,24 and the latter trial prompted not 
additional attention to Senate rules but attempts to avoid similar 
trials in the future .25 Almost forty years later , when the Senate 
was next confronted with the serious prospect o f  a trial on 
articles of impeachment , its Rules Committee-understandably 
concerned about appearing to change the rules after the game 
had started-eschewed comprehensive overhaul in favor of mi­
nor adjustments .26 After President Nixon defaulted , the Senate 
too left the court , its rules unchanged . 27 When a crisis loomed 
again in 1986 , the Senate dusted off the 1974 proposed amend­
ments and implemented them without change. 28 
This may, however , be the first time that Congress seriously 
considers constitutional amendments relating to the remov al of 
federal judges . The vehicle of change-or should I say the change 
of vehicle-is not surprising in light of the animated constitu­
tional debate that has attended statutory proposals over the last 
fifty years . 29 Moreover, recent attacks on Congress' 1980 com­
promise in the courts and in the literature30 demonstrate the 
fragility of legislation in this area, even that which carefully 
22 S. Res. 1 8 ,  74th Cong . ,  1 st Sess .  ( 1 935) ;  see 79 CoNG. REc. 8309- 1 0  ( 1 935) .  For 
the history of use of committees by the Senate in impeachment trials, see Procedure and 
Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate, S. Doc. No .  1 02 ,  93d 
Cong . ,  2d Sess. 3 3-34 ( 1 974) .  See also infra text accompanying notes 202-22. 
23 See 38 CoNG. REc. 3360, 3992 ( 1 904); J. BaRKIN, supra note 1 6, at 1 97 .  Barkin 
was unaware of the 1 935  change in the Senate rules . See id. Senator Hoar apparently 
made his proposal in anticipation of the impeachment and trial of Judge Swayne. See 3 8  
CoNG. REc. 3732 ( 1 904) . 
24 See, e.g. , 80 CoNG. REC. 4982 (1936). 
'' See supra text accompanying notes 17 - 18 .  
26 See S.  Res .  390,  93d Cong . ,  2d Sess .  ( 1 974) ; 1 20 CoNG. REc. 29,8 1 1 - 1 3  ( 1 974) ; 
see also, e.g., Senate Rules, supra note 2 1 ,  at 8 ,  88 , 95 , 97. , 
27 S. Res. 390, supra note 26, was laid on the table by motion of Senator Byrd on 
December 1 1 , 1 974. 1 20 CONG. REC. 39,054 ( 1974) . 
28 See S. Res. 479,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess . ( 1986) ; 1 32 CoN G.  REc. S 1 1 ,902-03 (daily 
ed . Aug. 1 5 ,  1986). 
29 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 291-308. In fact, this represents a return to the 
vehicle originally proposed. See supra text accompanying note 16 .  
30 See, e.g. , Hastings v .  Judicial Conference of  the United States ,  593  F .  Supp. 
1 3 7 1  ( 1984) , aff'd in part and vacated in part, 770 F.2d 1093 (D .C. Cir. 1 985) ,  cert. 
denied, 106 S. Ct. 3272 ( 1 986) ; Note, Unnecessary and Improper: The Judicial Councils 
Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 94 YALE L.J .  1 1 1 7 ( 1 984-85) .  
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excepts removal . The record of the debate and awareness of  
current attacks should suffice to persuade today '  s legislators that 
removal pursuant to statute is unlikely to survive constitutional 
challenge . 
Proceeding by way of  constitutional amendment h as the 
distinct advantage of mooting arguments rooted in the decent 
obscurity of arrangements framed two hundred years ago .  Con­
gress is spared the difficult and hazardous task of restoration.  
A new canvas is available for the work of contemporary artists 
and the judgment of  contemporary critics , both of them at least 
formally unencumbered by traditions if not by conventions .  
Conventions are, o f  course , a distinct disadvantage in the 
art of constitutional amendment . 3 1  The work of the artists , ex­
pensive enough to create, has no market until it has been ap­
proved by a process of critical j udgment that is vastly more 
expensive .  No matter what the subject , the transaction costs of  
a constitutional amendment are enormous , and they increase as 
the subject becomes more controversial . 
Moreover ,  even contemporary artists should hesitate to  urge 
that their work , however distinguished, replace one panel of a 
triptych by old masters that has been displayed for two hundred 
years . When the subject of a proposed constitutional amendment 
involves matters that are basic to the operations of one branch 
of the federal government, transaction costs are as nothing com­
pared to the costs of potential error in treating a polycentric 
problem32 as if it had only one dimension. 
3' The Congress , whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of 
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention 
for proposing Amendments, which, in  either Case, shall be valid to all 
Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in 
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be 
proposed by the Congress . . . .  
U . S .  CoNST. art. V.  See generally M.F.  BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED ( 1 986) . 
32 One useful approach, developed by Lon Fuller, is the concept of the 
"polycentric" ("many-centered") problem . As described by Fuller, the po­
lycentric issue is characterized by a large number of possible results and by 
the fact that many interests or groups will be affected by any solution 
adopted ; thus, each potential solution will have complex and unique rami­
fications. In graphic terms, the polycentric controversy can be visualized as 
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This Essay is intended as a cautionary note to those who,  
quite correctly, have concluded that constitutional amendment 
is the only way to replace current arrangements for the removal 
of federal judges. It proceeds from the premise that an inde­
pendent federal judiciary is essential to the maintenance of the 
delicate balance of federal powers33 and that ,  therefore, propos­
als that might diminish the judiciary's independence should 
emerge from a process of wide-ranging and careful study . I take 
the position that , because the stakes are so high, the process 
should include comparative assessment not just of current ar­
rangements and proposed alternatives under a new constitutional 
grant but also of adjustments that might be made with fidelity 
to the provisions of the Constitution and thus without change 
to those provisions . 
The problem of rempval of federal judges m ust be  set in 
context . The relevant contexts include both the place of judicial 
independence in our scheme of government and the place of 
removal in the arsenal of weapons available to deal with mis­
behaving or disabled federal j udges. Assuming general agreement 
as to the first , I will operate largely within the second . Change 
by constitutional amendment should be deferred until it is clear 
that adjustments faithful to the Constitution would be  either an 
inadequate response to perceived problems or a demonstrably 
less satisfactory response than the alternatives . 
I .  A SURVEY OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
It may be hard for us to imagine a federal j udiciary that is 
not independent , because we have never known it any other way . 
The framers were , however , acutely conscious of the dangers of 
a spider web, since " [a] pull on one strand will distribute tensions after a 
complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole . . . .  [E]ach crossing 
of strands is a distinct center for distributing tension. "  
Boyer, Alternatives to A dm inistrative Trial-Type Hearings for Resolving Complex Scien­
tific, Economic, and Social Issues, 7 1  MicH. L. REv. 1 1 1 , 1 1 6- 1 7  ( 1 972-73) (footnotes 
omitted). 
33 See, e.g. , Greenhouse, House Unit Concludes Federal Judges Cannot Be Im ­
peached for Their Rulings, N . Y .  Times , Oct. 28, 1 986, at 3 ,  col . 1 .  But see supra note 
20 (listing numerous proposals for constitutional amendments within the last seven years 
that would diminish if not destroy the independence of federal judges) .  
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domination of the judiciary , and they sought to prevent such 
domination by provisions guaranteeing tenure during good be­
havior and undiminished compensation . 34 Moreover , although 
arguments have emerged during the last fifty years or so asserting 
that a federal judge can be removed by means other than that 
specifically provided in the Constitution, 35 both the text36 and 
the views of its earliest expositors37 affirm the verdict of history 
in favor of the exclusivity of the impeachment process.38 
The framers recognized that the impeachment process would 
be arduous ; indeed,  by rej ecting a substantive norm of  great 
elasticity , they signaled an intent to ensure that it not be lightly 
commenced . 39 Their deliberations , however , revolved chiefly 
around the President , who would be subj ect to periodic elec­
tions.40 Federal j udges are not so subject ,  and for that reason 
alone , it is important to consider the entire array of checks 
against their misconduct or disability . 
A. The Appointments Process 
The appointments process for federal judges constitutes a 
first line of defense .41 There is no excuse for the President to 
3 4  "The Judges , both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices 
during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compen­
sation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office . "  U . S .  CoNST. 
art . III , § I; see 2 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF I 787 428-30 (M . 
Farrand rev. ed . I 966) [hereinafter Farrand] ; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 79 (A . Hamilton); 
I THE WoRKS OF lAMEs WILSON 323-3I (R. McCloskey ed. I 967) . 
35 See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS I22-80 
( I 973); Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision,  and Removal-Some Possi­
bilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L .  REv. 870 ( 1 929-30). 
36 See supra note I .  
37 See T HE  FEDERALIST Nos. 78 & 7 9  (A. Hamilton); I T HE  WoRKs o F  lAMEs 
WILSON, supra note 34, at 326; W. RAWLE, A VIEw OF THE CoNsTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 208 ( 1 825);  3 J .  STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § I629 (I833); see a/so id. §§ I625-26. 
38 See, e.g. , H .R. REP. No. I3 1 3 ,  96th Cong. ,  2d Sess .  l7- I 8  ( I 980); Otis, supra 
note 1 8 ,  at 3-IO. 
39 See 2 Farrand, supra note 34, at 550.  
40 See id. at 64-69. 
" "[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate , shall appoint . . .  Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States , whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law . . . .  " U .S .  CoNST . art . I I ,  § 2. 
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nominate to the federal bench a person whose life to that point 
contains substantial evidence, accessible to skilled investigators , 
of, or of vulnerability to , misconduct or disability that would 
be unacceptable in a j udge .  There is similarly no excuse for the 
Senate to confirm a nominee in the absence of proof of skilled 
investigation and of the informed judgment of the nominee' s  
peers concermng his or  her character and fitness for judicial 
office.42 
B. Retirement and Disability Statutes 
Physical or mental disability may not be detectible through 
skilled investigation; they may not exist or may not be  foresee­
able at the time of appointment . It  is hard to view insanity as 
a species of "[t]reason , [b]ribery, or other high [c]rime[] and 
[m]isdemeanor[]' ' 43 and equally hard to believe that the framers 
consigned us to the ravings of a lunatic judge until death . 
Hamilton dealt with the subj ect in a passage of exquisite ambi­
guity . 44 The removal of Judge Pickering can be laid to other 
4 2  The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and 
absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the 
door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their having coun­
teracted the good intentions of the Executive .  If  an ill appointment should 
be made, the Executive for nominating, and the Senate for approving, 
would participate, though in different degrees, in the opprobrium and 
disgrace. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 94 (A. Hamilton) (E. Bourne ed. 190 1 ) . 
43 U.S.  CaNST. art . I I ,  § 4 .  
44 The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of  inability 
has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men will be sensible 
that such a provision would either not be practiced upon or would be more 
liable to abuse than calculated to answer any good purpose. The mensuration 
of the faculties of the mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of  
known arts .  An attempt to fix the boundary between the regions of  ability 
and inability, would much oftener give scope to personal and party attach­
ments and enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good. 
The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part be arbitrary; 
and insanity, without any formal or express provision, may be safely pro­
nounced to be a virtual disqualification. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, supra note 42, at 1 09 (A. Hamilton). 
After repeating much of this passage, Justice Story concluded: " And instances of 
absolute imbecility would be too rare to justify the introduction of so dangerous a 
provision . "  3 J .  STORY, supra note 37,  at § 1 6 1 9. 
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grounds, although he apparently was insane. 45 The disabled fed­
eral j udge has been a problem throughout our history , both in 
his own right and as a tool of the corrupt ,46 but the problem 
was one that Congress always had the power to correct and that 
it has now gone far to correct. Sensible and humane statutes 
governing retirement ,47 disability ,48 senior status ,49 and annuities50 
should spare us another Pickering. The 1980 Act completed the 
remedial scheme with provisions that , albeit more controversial, 
address the situation of a disabled judge who cannot or will not 
accept what is  apparent to everybody else . 51 
C. The Shadow of the Impeachment Process 
Misconduct may not be the habit of a l ifetime; indeed , l ife 
tenure may bring it forth. In addition ,  not every species of  
misconduct by a federal judge warrants impeachment and re­
moval. The costs of the process ensure that the presumption 
runs the other way. How then can it be true,  as one student of 
j udicial corruption has concluded , that those few federal j udges 
who have been the subj ect of a solemn judgment of removal by 
the Senate are ,  in  a hierarchy of  j udicial infamy, the misde­
meanants rather than the felons?52 Part of the answer may lie 
"5 See HousE CoMM. ON T HE  JuDICIARY, 93D CoNG. , 2 D  SEss. , IMPEACHMENT, 
SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE 3 8 1 -409 (Comm . Print 1 974) [hereinafter IMPEACH­
MENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE]; J. BaRKIN, supra note 1 6 ,  at 1 98-99; P. 
HoFFER & N .  HuLL, supra note 1 1 ,  at 207-20. 
46 See, e .g ., J .  BaRKIN ,  supra note 1 6 ,  at 1 00-0 1 (Judge Buffington). 
47 See 28 U.S .C.  § 371  ( 1 982). 
48 See id. at § 372. 
" 9  See id. at § 294 . 
50 See id. at § 376. 
51 The actions a judicial council may take upon receipt of a report of a special 
committee appointed to investigate a complaint include: 
(ii) certifying disability of a judge appointed to hold office during 
good behavior whose conduct is the subject of the complaint, pursuant to 
the procedures and standards provided under subsection (b) of this section; 
(iii) requesting that any such judge appointed to hold office during 
good behavior voluntarily retire, with the provision that the length of service 
requirements under section 37 1 of this title shall not apply; 
(iv) ordering that, on a temporary basis for a time certain, no further 
cases be assigned to any judge or magistrate whose conduct is the subject 
of a complaint. . . .  
!d. at § 372(c)(6) . 
'2 See J. BaRKIN, supra note 16, at 195. 
654 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [VOL. 76  
in the fact that,  however ponderous,  the constitutional arrange­
ments have provided a sufficiently credible threat to prompt 
numerous federal judges to resign rather than risk impeachment 
and removal. 53 Some of those individuals ,  apparently,  saw the 
shadow not of Jefferson's "scare-crow"54 but of Lord Bryce's 
"hundred-ton gun . "55 The gun was in mothballs for fifty years. 
It casts a shadow again. 
D. The Criminal Process 
Another part of the answer may lie in the influence of the 
criminal process on decisions to resign. The proper place of that 
process under current constitutional arrangements is  a difficult 
question and one that I explore later in this Essay. 56 For the 
present , it is  enough to note that ,  even when the criminal pros­
ecution of a sitting federal j udge was even rarer than it is today ,  
the efforts of  exasperated public prosecutors helped to stimulate 
some of  the most corrupt federal judges to resignY 
E. The 1980 Act 
What then about federal judges who misbehave but are not 
corrupt , or at least not so corrupt as to attract the attention of 
public prosecutors or the sustained attention of Congress? There' s  
53 See id. at 27-28, 1 20,  1 8 1 ,  195 ,  200-04, 2 1 9-58.  O f  course, even the innocent may 
have concluded that the office was not worth the embarrassment and expense of impeach­
ment proceedings . 
54 "For experience has already shown that the impeachment [the Constitution] has 
provided is not even a scare-crow. "  Letter from Hon. Thomas Jefferson to Hon.  Spencer 
Roane (Sept. 6, 1 8 1 9) ,  reprinted in 1 0  THE WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 1 4 1  (P . Ford 
ed. 1 899). 
55 Impeachment . . . is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional 
arsenal, but because it is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a 
hundred-ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, 
an enormous charge of  power to fire it, and a large mark to aim it .  
1 J .  BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 283 ( 1 888) .  
5 6  See infra text accompanying notes 1 02-38 .  
5' Two o f  the judges whose careers are chronicled b y  Borkin, United States Senior 
Circuit Judge Martin Manton and United States District Judge Albert Johnson, were 
probably influenced to resign both by the impeachment process and by the criminal 
process. See J .  BaRKIN, supra note 16 ,  at 27-28, 18 1 -83 ;  see also 1 26 CaNG. REc . 25 ,371  
( 1 980) (statement of Rep . Rodino); J .  BaRKIN, supra note 16,  at  255-56 (United States 
District Judge Winslow) . 
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the rub. Modern federal judicial administration dates from a 
period of extraordinary public attention to problems of judicial 
corruption .58 But the powers given to the arms of federal judicial 
administration , and in particular the judicial councils of the 
circuits , were not well defined in 1939 , and their capacity to 
deal with judicial misbehavior remained in doubt for years .59 A 
1970 Supreme Court decision in a case brought to challenge the 
exercise of those powers hardly resolved the doubts .60 That was 
one of the main goals of Congress in enacting the Judicial 
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disabi lity Act of  
1980. 61 
By clarifying the authority of the judiciary to consider com­
plaints of misconduct or disability and by providing a process 
and procedural charter for such consideration, as well as a 
partial but limiting enumeration of responsive actions , the 1980 
Act fills a gaping hole in society' s  defense against the excesses 
of life tenure . 62 If well and faithfully implemented , it can serve 
as both credible supplement and credible alternative to the proc­
ess of impeachment and removal. In this case,  "supplement" 
and "alternative" are not euphemisms for replacement . Congress 
attempted to ensure that the Act not supplant the constitutionally 
prescribed process in matters of sufficient gravity to suggest the 
need for it63 and that ,  in any event, it could not be used to 
' "  The judicial councils of the circuits were created by the Administrative Office 
Act of 1939, ch . 501 , 53 Stat . 1 223 . See generally P. FisH, THE PoLITICS OF FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1 25-65 , 379-426 ( 1 973) .  For the link in the text, see id. at 1 14 .  
59 See Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at  291 -92, 294. 
60 See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit, 398 U .S .  74 ( 1 970). 
6' See H . R .  REP. No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38 ,  at I ,  7 .  
62 See generally Burbank, supra note 7 ;  Burbank, The Federal Judicial Discipline 
Act: Is Decentralized Self-Regulation Working?, 67 JUDICATURE 1 83 ( 1 983-84); Burbank, 
Politics and Progress in Implementing the Federal Judicial Discipline Act, 7 1  JuDICATURE 
1 3  ( 1 987 -88) [hereinafter Politics and Progress]. 
63 (B) In any case in which the judicial council determines, on the basis of  
a complaint and an investigation under this subsection, or  on the basis of 
information otherwise available to the council, that a judge appointed to 
hold office during good behavior has engaged in conduct-
(i) which might constitute one or more grounds for impeachment 
under article I of the Constitution; or 
(ii) which, in the interest of justice, is not amenable to resolution 
by the judicial council , 
the judicial council shall promptly certify such determination, together with 
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remove a federal judge.64 Moreover , in  cases of  such gravity , 
Congress hoped that proceedings under the Act would yield a 
record that would measurably lighten the burden of  exercising 
its constitutional responsibilities . 65 In either situation , when al­
leged misconduct is not grounds for impeachment and removal 
and when it may be ,  the Act can take the pressure off the 
constitutionally prescribed process and cast a shadow of its own . 
Whether it will be permitted to fulfill its potential , by the body 
responsible for its passage, the bodies responsible for its imple­
mentation , or by the courts , are matters to which I shall return . 
F. In formal Approaches 
Finally in this survey of current arrangements ,  it is  important 
to note the role of  informal approaches to problems of  miscon­
duct or disability in the federal judiciary . At one time it was 
probably the case that collegial or hierarchical suasion was the 
most common and effective supplement to the impeachment 
process , at least when the latter was not a credible threat . 66 
Although the 1 980 Act has tended to divert attention from 
informal processes, Congress did not intend to supplant them. 
any complaint and a record of any associated proceedings, to the Judicial 
Conference of the United States. 
(8) Upon referral or certification of any matter under paragraph (7) 
of this subsection, the Judicial Conference, after consideration of the prior 
proceedings and such additional investigation as it considers appropriate, 
shall by majority vote take such action, as described in paragraph (6)(B) of 
this subsection , as it considers appropriate. If the Judicial Conference 
concurs in the determination of the council, or makes its own determination, 
that consideration of impeachment may be warranted, it shall so certify and 
transmit the determination and the records of proceedings to the House of 
Representatives for whatever action the House of Representatives considers 
to be necessary. 
28 U .S .C. §§ 372(c)(7)(B) & (8) ( 1 982). 
64 The Act provides that "in no circumstances may the council order removal from 
office of any judge appointed to hold office during good behavior." !d. at § 372(c)(6)(B)(vii). 
65 See, e.g., 1 26 CoNG. REc . 28,097 ( 1980) (statement of Senator Thurmond); 
Burbank, supra note 7, at 304 n .85 .  
66 See R.  WHEELER & A.  LEVIN, JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL IN  THE UNITED 
STATES 9, 1 3- 14 ,  74 ( 1 979) . 
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Indeed,  to the extent that the Act clarified the existence of 
formal power , they should be stronger Y 
I I .  ADJUSTMENTS IN CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS 
The transaction costs of  a constitutional amendment are such 
that , whatever the subj ect, that course should be pursued only 
when it is clear that the problem cannot be addressed satisfac­
torily and at less cost by adjustments in current arrangements. 
When the problem implicates an essential attribute of one branch 
of the federal government , the error costs to be considered are 
enormous , additional reason to proceed cautiously. 
It may not be fair to tax legislators who have recently pro­
posed constitutional amendments regarding federal judicial dis­
cipline with undue haste, as their proposals can be viewed as 
merely vehicles for inviting the kind of broad-ranging and careful 
comparative assessment that , I have argued , is necessary in light 
of  the stakes involved . To advance such an assessment , this 
section wil l  explore possible adjustments in current arrangements 
that might make them more effective in dealing with the prob­
lems that have been identified. First , however , it is necessary to 
state those problems. 
Some of the recent proposals were animated by the sense 
that , when a federal judge has been convicted of a felony and 
has exhausted direct appeals but nevertheless refuses to resign, 
the costs of the impeachment process are simply too great and 
that a more efficient remedy is appropriate .  68 Some o f  the pro­
posals, however , proceed from the view that the costs of remov­
ing any federal judge, criminally convicted or not , are too great 
under current arrangements, 69 and one of  them purports to 
derive support for the conclusion from the alleged ineffectiveness 
6 7  See, e.g., 1 26 CoNG. REc . 25 ,37 1 ( 1 980) (statement of Rep . Rodino); id. at 28,092 
( 1980) (statement of Sen . DeConcini) ;  Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 
22; Fitzpatrick, Misconduct and Disability of Federal Judges: The Unreported Informal 
Responses, 71 JUDICATURE 282 ( 1 988) . 
68 See supra note 5 ;  132 CONG. REc . S7867 (daily ed . June 1 8, 1 986) (statement of 
Sen. DeConcini); Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S. J. Res. 3 70, supra note 5, at 30-31 
(statement of Stephen B. Burbank). 
69 See supra note 6;  132 CoNG. REc . S4990-9 1 (daily ed . Apr. 9, 1 987) (statement 
of Sen. Heflin); id. at S8746 (daily ed . June 26, 1 986) (statement of Sen . DeConcini) .  
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of the 1980 Act as a supplement to  the constitutionally prescribed 
process . 70 
In considering how current arrangements might be adjusted 
to minimize costs,  logic suggests starting with means to avoid 
invocation of the i mpeachment process. That process ,  we have 
seen , is the last defense against the excesses of life tenure.  What 
changes are possible in,  or at least what questions should be 
asked about , all lines of defense? 
A. The Appoin tments Process 
Criticisms of the appointments process tend to focus on the 
means by which those involved in the process ,  formally and 
informally , assess the intellectual and the experiential qualifica­
tions of potential and actual nominees . 71 It may be that ,  recog­
nizing the limitations of even a skilled investigation of moral 
character and fitness for judicial office, little room for improve­
ment exists in that aspect of current appointments practice . At 
the least , however , it would be useful to confirm that back­
ground investigations are being conducted on all nominees to an 
article III position ,  72 that they are being conducted by skilled 
7 0  See 1 32 CoNG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1 986) (statement of  Sen . De­
Concini). 
" See S .  Res. 459, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1 984); 1 27 CoNG. REc. S 1 2,529-32 (daily 
ed . Oct . 1, 1 984) (statement of Sen . Specter); ABA Takes Heat on Hill over Rating of 
Bork, Nat'l .  L . J ., Oct. 5, 1 987, at 5 .  
72 Those who find this question silly should endeavor t o  answer it . I have been told 
by a confidential source, but have been unable to verify, that something was badly amiss 
in the background work on Harry Claiborne. If that is true, the Senate should have 
spared us the hand-wringing about his impeachment trial. 
At the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on Claiborne's nomination, the following 
was the full extent of questioning: 
Senator DeConcini . Thank you. Have you made a full financial disclosure 
to the Department of Justice? 
Mr. Claiborne . Yes, I have. 
Senator DeConcini. And have you received a questionnaire from Senator 
Mathias? 
Mr. Claiborne. Yes sir; I have, and I have answered them. 
Senator DeConcini . Do you hold any positions in or are you a member of 
any board of directors of any corporations? 
Mr. Claiborne. I do not. 
Senator DeConcini . Thank you . I have no further questions. 
Nominations of Harry E. Claiborne, et a!.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the 
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investigators , and that the latter are pursuing appropriate ave­
nues of inquiry , with appropriate thoroughness . To what extent 
are those conducting the investigations expected or permitted to 
provide a record not j ust about moral character and fitness but 
also about intellectual ability? If  they do pursue both lines of 
inquiry , is the practice likely to diminish the effectiveness of the 
investigation as to both because it precludes the investigators ' 
full attention to either , including by skewing the sample of those 
consulted?73 These and other questions about the information 
available to those involved in the appointments process should 
be explored both from a normative perspective and with the 
benefit of analysis of the pre-appointment material on federal 
judges of recent notoriety, to the extent such material exists . 74 
B. Retirement and Disability Statutes 
Although current statutes regarding retirement , disability, 
senior status,  and annuities appear , at last , adequate to remove 
the main incentive for a physically or mentally disabled judge 
to remain on the bench after his time, it would be a simple task 
to confirm that fact with those most likely to be aware of any 
problems , the chief j udges of the district courts and of the courts 
of appeals .  Moreover , because financial incentives do not ex­
haust the possible reasons for continuation in active service , the 
proposed inquiry should include an assessment of the effective-
Judiciary, 95th Cong. ,  2d Sess . 6 ( 1 978) (transcript), printed in REPORT OF THE SENATE 
IMPEACHMENT TRIAL CoMMITTEE: HEARINGS oN THE IMPEACHMENT OF HARRY E. CLAI­
BORNE, JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
NEVADA, OF HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS BEFORE THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL 
CoMM . ,  S .  HRG. REP . No.  8 1 2 ,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess. 2259 ( 1 986) [hereinafter REPORT OF 
THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE) . 
For criticisms of the confirmation process and suggested improvements, see , e.g., 
Jost, No More Assembly-Line Nominations, Legal Times, Nov. 1 6, 1 987, at 1 6. For 
recent essays on that process with regard to appointments to the Supreme Court , see 
Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 1 0 1  HARv .  L. REv. 1 1 46 ( 1 988) . 
73 These questions are prompted by my experience in an interview with an FBI 
agent regarding an individual who was subsequently confirmed as an article III judge . 
Most of the interview consisted of questions attempting to probe the individual 's views 
about law and politics. Very few of them , and those presented by the agent as pro forma, 
concerned moral character and fitness .  
7 4  See supra note 72. 
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ness of the 1 980 Act in helping the federal judiciary with the 
painful business of bearing bad news .  75 
C. The 1980 Act 
The 1 980 Act was not addressed primarily to the problem of  
the disabled judge, and its effectiveness in helping to remedy 
and to deter misconduct is a critical question to be addressed in 
a comparative assessment of the sort advocated here . Happily , 
there is already a good deal of information available that b ears 
on that question,  and it is possible to hazard some answers as 
well as pose some additional questions . 
Contrary to the assertions of a senator who has sought to 
use the alleged ineffectiveness of the 1 980 Act as support for a 
constitutional amendment to implement a wholly new system for 
remedying misconduct , including by removal , the record of the 
federal judiciary under that Act has hardly been one of ' ' inac­
tivity . "76 Since October 1 98 1 ,  when the Act became effective , 
1 1 53  complaints have been filed, of which forty-seven remained 
pending on June 30 , 1 987 .77 It is true that chief judges have 
dismissed most of the complaints filed under the Act , but that 
was to be expected , and Congress did expect it .78 As an interested 
and relatively well-informed student of the Act and its imple­
mentation, I have seen no evidence that those charged with 
responsibilities in the process of complaint disposition have failed 
in the exercise of those responsibilities . The information pres­
ently available suggests that the Act is working and that the 
explanation for the small number of complaints that have re­
quired investigation and the even smaller number that have 
required action by a judici?-1 council lies in the generally high 
7 5  The inquiry should include both formal and informal actions. As to the former, 
see In re the Complaint Against a District Judge Under 28 U.S .C .  § 372(c) (3d Cir. 
Judicial Council 1982) (order requesting disabled judge to retire voluntarily under 28 
U.S .C.  § 372(c)(6)(B)(iii)) (copy on file with the author) . 
76 132 CoNG. REc. S8746 (daily ed. June 26, 1 986) (statement of Sen . DeConcini); 
see Burbank, Politics & Progress, supra note 62, at 22. 
77 See 1 987 ADMIN. OFFIC E oF THE U.S .  CouRTS ANN . REP. oF THE DIRECTOR 92-
95 . 
78 See Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 322. 
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quality of the federal bench . 79 Support for an alternative expla­
nation, if it exists ,  will only be found after a detailed analysis 
of complaints and their disposition . That will require hard work 
rather than easy assertion ; it may even require a statutory 
amendment . 80 
It is also not true,  as asserted by the same senator , that the 
j udicial councils ' 'have not even come up with rules and guide­
lines for the conduct of their operations , "8 1 although their ef­
forts in that regard have been the object of criticism . 82 Most of 
the criticisms may soon be moot , as the councils respond to the 
Judicial Conference' s  recommendation that they substantially 
adopt, on an experimental basis, i llustrative rules prepared by a 
special subcommittee of the Conference of Chief Judges of  the 
Court of Appeals . 83 The illustrative rules provide answers , usu­
ally sensible answers , to most of the procedural questions un­
certainty about which was harmful to Congress '  goal of improving 
public accountability while protecting the independence of fed­
eral judges . Moreover , if  most of the councils adopt them in 
substantial part , as recommended by the Conference, the answers 
will be substantially uniform, with a consequent reduction in the 
costs of disuniformity to the attainment of Congress' goals . 84 
Apart from the uninformed assertions of an unreconstructed 
proponent of another scheme , perceptions of the Act ' s  effec­
tiveness have been adversely affected by two developments , one 
discrete and easily addressed , the other more widespread and 
more intractable. 
Some members of Congress were evidently unhappy that ,  
once Judge Claiborne had exhausted direct appeals from his 
79 See Burbank ,  Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22.  As noted there, "the 
statistics do not give a clear picture of the role that informal adjustments play , either 
after a complaint has been filed-chief judges have concluded 37 proceedings under the 
Act on the ground that appropriate corrective action had been taken-or in the absence 
of a formal complaint . "  !d. See also Fitzpatrick, supra note 67. 
so See 28 U.S .C.  § 372(c) ( l4) ( 1 982) (confidentiality of " [a]ll papers, documents, 
and records of proceedings related to investigations" with limited exceptions); see also 
Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 20-2 1 .  
8 1 132 CoNG. REc. S8746 (daily ed . June 26, 1 986) (statement of Sen . DeConcini) . 
" See Burbank, supra note 7, at 309-46. 
83 The text of the illustrative rules is reprinted in Burbank , Politics and Progress, 
supra note 62, at 23-28 .  
'"' See id. at 1 5-22. 
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felony conviction ,  the Judicial Council of the Ninth Circuit did 
not more promptly invoke a section of the Act providing for a 
certification of a determination that an article I I I  j udge ' 'has 
engaged in conduct . . .  which might constitute one or more 
grounds for impeachment under article I (sic) of the Constitu­
tion .  "85 I have explored elsewhere possible reasons for the delay 
and pointed out that , in any event , the certification process is a 
mere formality in a case like Judge Claiborne ' s ,  which was 
notorious and the factual underpinnings of which were fully 
developed in a court record . 86 It is not clear , in other words , 
whether members of  Congress had good reason to be  unhappy, 
and the experience is hardly evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
the Act generally . The certification process has been used twice 
again; 87 rules adopted by the Judicial Conference at its Septem­
ber 1 987 meeting should help,  88 and if need be ,  any remaining 
problems can be addressed by statutory amendment . 89 
A more serious threat to the effectiveness o f  the 1 980 Act , 
which depends in consequential measure on perceptions of  its 
effectiveness , arises from continuing uncertainty about its con­
stitutionality . Just as some members of Congress continue to 
believe that , as a compromise ,  the legislation did not go far 
enough , others,  in Congress and out , believe that it went too 
far . The broadest attack argues that the impeachment process is  
the exclusive means not only to remove an article III  j udge but 
to constrain such a j udge in the exercise of the duties of office 
" 28 U.S .C .  § 372(c)(7)(B) ( 1982), quoted in full supra note 63 . 
'6 See Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 3 70, supra note 5 ,  at 32-33 (statement 
of Stephen B. Burbank); see also Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22 
n. 1 1 3 .  
8' See Hastings v .  Judicial Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 9 1 ,  96-97 
(D.C.  Cir . 1 987), cert. denied, 56 U.S .L .W.  3 7 1 5  (U .S .  Apr . 1 8 ,  1 988) (Judge Hastings); 
Rodino Announces Impeachment Inquiry, supra note 4 (Judge Nixon) . 
88 See Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States for the Processing of 
Certificates from Judicial Councils That a Judicial Officer Has Engaged in Conduct That 
Might Constitute Grounds for Impeachment, 1 987 Reports of the Proceedings of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States 97-99 (Washington, D.C.  Mar. 1 7 ,  1 987 & Sept. 
2 1 ,  1 987). 
89 See H.R.  4393 , 1 00th Cong . ,  2d Sess . § 10 1 (d) ( 1 988) (proposing special trans­
mittal process in case of judge or magistrate convicted of felony who has exhausted direct 
appeals); Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S. J. Res. 370, supra note 5 ,  at 3 3  (statement of 
Stephen B. Burbank) . 
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for reasons of alleged misconduct or disability . 90 Narrower at­
tacks may focus on a particular constraint authorized by the 
Act , on the procedures specified therein or those actually em­
ployed for complaint disposition , on the certification process ,  
or  for that matter , on a host of other provisions or practices . 9 1 
There is little that can or should be done to prevent attacks 
on the 1 980 Act , whether they take the form of commentary in 
j ournals or pleadings in a lawsuit . 92 Those who are disturbed by,  
as well as  those making , such attacks should recall that most of 
the issues currently being raised were aired with unusual thor­
oughness during the long legislative process yielding the ultimate 
compromise and that the framers of that legislation were unu­
sually candid and careful in attempting to meet and to resolve 
constitutional obj ections . 93 Until such time as the Supreme Court 
authoritatively holds to the contrary, we should assume that they 
were successful .  Indeed , this may be a subject about which 
responsible members of Congress should be sufficiently con­
cerned to monitor the quality of the defense of its efforts in any 
litigation challenging their constitutionality . 
For those who believe that the constitutional provisions re­
garding article I I I  judges are ' 'underdeterminate ' '94-in the pres­
ent climate, a population that probably is growing-it may be 
90 See, e.g. , 1 26 CoNG. REc. 28 ,093-97 ( 1 980) (statement o f  Sen. Mathias) ; Note, 
supra note 30. 
'1 See, e.g. , Hastings v. Judicial Conference of the United States , 657 F. Supp. 672 
(D .D.C.  1986), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part, 829 F.2d 91 (D .C.  Cir . 1 987), cert. denied, 
56 U.S .L .W.  37 1 5  (U .S .  Apr. 1 8 ,  1988); Hastings v .  Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 593 F. Supp. 1 3 7 1  (D.D.C.  1 984), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 770 F .2d 
1093 (D.C.  Cir. 1 985), cert. denied, 106 S .  Ct . 3272 ( 1 986) . 
92 But see 28 U.S .C .  § 372(c)( 1 0) ( 1 982) ("Except as expressly provided in this 
paragraph, all orders and determinations, including denials of petitions for review, shall 
be final and conclusive and shall not be judicially reviewable on appeal or otherwise. ") .  
In remanding some of Judge Hastings' due process claims, the court of appeals noted 
that "sensitive and unsettled questions of constitutional law would arise if the challenged 
actions are covered by the prohibition of judicial review. "  Hastings v .  Judicial Conference 
of the United States, 829 F.2d 9 1 ,  108 n .69 (D.C.  Cir . 1 987), cert. denied, 56 U .S .L .W.  
37 1 5  (U .S.  Apr. 1 8 ,  1 988) . 
93 See H . R .  REP . No . 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38 ,  at 2-5 , 1 6- 1 9; Burbank, supra note 7 ,  
at 29 1 -300;  Kastenmeier and Remington, Judicial Discipline: A Legislative Perspctive, 76 
KY . L . J .  763 , 77 1 -73 ( 1 987-88) [hereinafter Kastenmeier] . 
94 See Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U .  CHI . 
L .  REV . 462 , 473 ( 1 987) . 
664 KENTUCKY LAW J OURNAL [VoL.  7 6  
appropriate t o  note that the major compromises in the 1 980 Act 
were in favor of judicial independen ce95 and that ,  when the 
vehicle of change is a constitutional amendment , two-hundred­
year-old bets are o ff .  
The last i s  also fair comment t o  those i n  the federal j udiciary, 
whether originally opponents of the 1 980 legislation or j ust the 
reluctant recipients of the workload it imposes , who wish that 
it would go away . Indeed, because federal j udges are an impor­
tant part of the legal climate, we may expect that some o f  them 
would include consideration of alternatives in deciding, as judges , 
what the Constitution permits , even i f  they would not admit it . 96 
The pressing need at this point is for authoritative resolu­
tion(s) of  constitutional attacks on the 1 980 Act . That there has 
been no such resolution to date has not been for lack o f  effort 
by Judge Hastings,  an individual who was intensely and person­
ally interested in upsetting proceedings under the Act before they 
upset him .97 Some o f  the grounds o f  attack have been rej ected 
by the courts that considered them; a number have been deferred 
and may never be reached at his instance. 98 Perhaps the deferrals 
were justi fied , although in future cases , courts may wish to 
consider whether continued deferrals will yield no review and 
whether the chill to the Act 's  effectiveness bred by continuing 
9' See Burbank, supra note 7, at 283-84, 291 -308 . 
96 For a sense of the alternatives, see supra note 20. We may also expect that judges 
would be aware of if not influenced by the fact that the 1 980 legislation was based on a 
bill approved by the Judicial Conference. See Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 300. 
97 In addition to the cases cited supra note 9 1 ,  see Williams v.  Mercer, 6 1 0  F .  Supp. 
1 69 (S .D. Fla. 1 985), aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub. nom. In re Certain Complaints 
Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh 
Circuit, 783 F.2d 1 488 ( 1 1 th Cir .) ,  eert. denied sub. nom. Hastings v. Godbold, 1 06 S .  
Ct. 3273 ( 1 986); In re Petition t o  Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials, 576 F .  Supp. 
1 275 (S.D. Fla. 1 983), ajj'd, 735 F.2d 1 26 1  ( 1 1th Cir .) ,  eert. denied sub. nom. Hastings 
v.  Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 469 U.S .  884 
( 1 984); ef United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1 278 ( 1 1 th Cir.) ,  reh 'g en bane denied, 
704 F .2d 559 ( 1 1th Cir.),  eert. denied, 461 U .S .  93 1 ( 1 983);  United States v .  Hastings, 
68 1 F .2d 706 ( 1 1 th Cir . ) ,  reh 'g en bane denied, 689 F.2d 1 92 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1 982), eert. 
denied, 459 U.S .  1 203 ( I  983). 
The change of venue to the House of Representatives has not deterred Judge 
Hastings . See In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 8 1 - 1  (Miami) ,  669 F .  
Supp . 1 072 (S .D .  Fla . ) ,  ajj'd, 833  F .2d 1438  ( 1 1th Cir . 1 987); In re Grand Jury Pro­
ceedings, 841 F.2d 1 048 ( 1 1 th Cir . 1 988). 
9 8  See, e.g. , Hastings, 829 F .2d at 9 1 ;  Hastings v .  Judicial Conference of the United 
States, 770 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985), eert. denied, 1 06 S. Ct. 3272 ( 1 986) . 
1 987-88]  REMOVAL OF FEDERAL JUDGES 665 
uncertainty about the constitutionality of one or more of its 
provisions renders passivity no longer virtuous .  99 At the least , 
one would hope not to see again a supposed exercise in p assivity 
the effect if not the purpose of which is to create such a chill . 100 
When there has been authoritative resolution of the consti­
tutional questions raised by the 1 980 Act ' s  detractors , and unless 
the result of that resolution is to adopt the position o f  those 
making the broadest attack-a result I deem extremely improb­
able-any defects in the Act can be corrected by amendments . 
In the meantime,  Congress should give the Act a chance to work 
as it was intended to work . That means both refraining from 
unsupported attacks on its implementation by the federal judi­
ciary in garden variety matters and focusing close attention on 
the fruits of its process in matters that reach the impeachment 
market . Congress should also correct by amendment defects that 
have been identified in the oversight process but that are not of 
constitutional significance . 1 0 1  
D. The Criminal Process 
We have seen that criminal investigations played a role in 
persuading some federal judges to resign. 102 More recently, we 
have twice witnessed the failure of a criminal conviction, af­
firmed on appeal , to have that effect . 103 The proper role o f  
criminal law enforcement in society ' s  defense against j udicial 
misbehavior is  a difficult and important question , whether ap-
99 Compare A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERous BRANcH 1 1 1 -98 ( 1 962) ("The Passive 
Virtues") with Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 ( 1 964) . 
100 See Hastings, 770 F .2d at 1 1 04- 1 1 (Edwards, J . ,  concurring). 
101 See H.R .  4393 , 1 00th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  § 1 0 1  ( 1 988); Oversight Hearing, supra 
note 8 ,  at 33-36 (statement of Stephen B .  Burbank); Kastenmeier, supra note 93 ,  at 7 8 1 -89. 
The provisions in the Act that seem to me most vulnerable to constitutional challenge 
are section 372(c)(6)(iv), quoted supra note 5 1 ,  and section 372(c)(7)(B), quoted supra 
note 63 . The problem with the latter could be solved if the words "has engaged" were 
changed to "may have engaged,"  as proposed in H.R .  4393 , supra. 
102 See supra text accompanying note 57 .  
103 Representative Sensenbrenner listed a "number of dubious distinctions that [Judge] 
Claiborne . . .  achieved, "  including that he was "the first sitting Federal Judge in [our] 
history to go to prison . "  1 32 CoNG. REc. H471 8  (daily ed. July 22, 1 986). Judge Nixon 
is the second. See supra note 4 .  
666 KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [VoL . 76 
proached from the relatively formal perspective o f  constitutional 
law or from the perspective of wise public policy . 
As to constitutional law , this is another matter on which we 
would benefit from authoritative guidance , although the number 
of criminal prosecutions of federal j udges in recent years suggests 
that federal prosecutors are not deterred by the absence of a 
Supreme Court holding on the constitutionality o f  prosecuting 
or imprisoning a sitting federal j udge . 1 04 Because ,  however , the 
lower court decisions on the question may not persuade 105 and 
because a comparative assessment of the sort advocated in this 
Essay should consider the future of criminal prosecutions , as 
well as their past , it may be useful to attempt to confine the 
field of debate.  
As a matter o f  constitutional law,  the prosecution o f  a 
federal judge before that individual had been removed pursuant 
to the impeachment process might be thought to violate article 
I ,  section 3 ,  clause 7 .  That clause provides that 
[j]udgment in Cases of  Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and 
enj oy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States : but the Party convicted shall ,  nevertheless , be liable 
and subject to Indictment, Trial , Judgment and Punishment , 
according to Law. 106 
The imprisonment o f  a sitting federal judge might be thought 
to violate both that provision and article I I ,  section 4, which 
provides that " [t]he President , Vice President and all civil O f-
104 There is, however, dictum to support the prosecutors. See United States v .  Lee, 
1 06 U.S .  1 96 ,  220 ( 1 882) (dictum); see also Chandler v .  Judicial Council of the Tenth 
Circuit, 398 U.S .  74, 1 40 (Douglas, J . ,  dissenting); id. at 1 4 1 -42 (Black, J . ,  dissenting); 
cf. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S .  501 ,  5 1 6  ( 1972) (rejecting senator's claim that 
speech or debate clause precluded prosecution). 
ws See United States v .  Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U .S .  
829 ( 1984); Hastings, 68 1 F.2d at  706; United States v .  Isaacs, 493 F .2d 1 124 (7th Cir .),  
cett. denied, 417 U.S. 976 ( 1 974) . 
This part of my work was prompted by student work-in-progress that has now been 
published. See Note, In Defense of the Constitution 's Judicial Impeachment Standard, 
86 MICH. L. REv. 420 ( 1988) . I am grateful to the author of that note, Ms .  Melissa 
Maxman, for sharing drafts with me and hopeful that, although we disagree, our exchange 
of views has been as stimulating for her as it has for me. 
1 06  For other relevant provisions, see supra note 1 .  
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ficers of the United States , shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for ,  and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery , or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors . ' '  
The formal constitutional argument against prosecution be­
fore removal through the impeachment process would impute to 
the language, "but the Party convicted shal l ,  nevertheless , be 
liable and subj ect to [criminal proceedings] , "  an intent by the 
framers and ratifiers of the Constitution to establish a strict 
order of precedence . 
As a matter of language , the words almost certainly should 
not be read that way .  Their context demonstrates that the people 
who wrote them were concerned lest a person "convicted " be 
able to abort criminal prosecution by invoking common law 
principles of double jeopardy and that their words were designed 
to meet that specific case. 107 As Raoul Berger has pointed out , 
"nevertheless" means "in spite of" not "afterwards . "  108 Nev­
ertheless , because the provision in question does refer to one 
who has been " convicted, "  and although the context dictated 
that choice, a linguistic inquiry is perhaps not decisive.  
Professor Berger sought support for his view that indictment 
and trial (even of a president) may precede removal by resorting 
to English practice, noting that " [o]n several occasions the P ar­
liament preferred to refer the case to the courts . " 109 This is not 
helpful because, as Berger himself elsewhere recognized, in Eng­
lish practice " criminal punishment and removal were wedded in 
one proceeding, " 1 10 whereas the framers made an informed de­
cision to divorce them . 
107 The purpose of the clause as a whole was to specify the limits of a j udgment of 
conviction following a Senate trial and in particular to implement the framers' intent to 
depart from the English practice of conflating the impeachment process and the criminal 
process. See infra text accompanying notes 1 1 6- 19 .  The sentence in question, making 
clear that those limits did not include immunity from criminal prosecution, used the 
words, "the Party convicted," because those were the words that the larger context 
required. 
106 Berger, The President, Congress, and the Courts, 83 YALE L.J.  1 1 1 1 ,  1 1 28 ( 1 973-
74) . 
109 !d. at 1 1 26.  
1 10 !d. at 1 1 24. "Berger has written a brief, not a history. Missing from his work is 
an appreciation of American colonial and state precedents, the latter of which were far 
more important in influencing federal law than English examples . "  P. HoFFER & N.  
Hun, supra note 1 1 , at 268 . 
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I f  we turn to contemporary interpretations o f  the Constitu­
tion , we find the matter still in doubt . There are at least two 
passages in The Federalist which suggest that the author contem­
plated removal before criminal prosecution, if he did not regard 
the order as a constitutional command . 1 1 1 The author was Al­
exander Hamilton. Although I would not j oin Professor B erger 
in dismissing H amilton's  views as those of a person whose 
' ' participation in the Convention was sporadic and had little , if 
any, influence , "  1 1 2 it i s  perhaps relevant that H amilton' s  own 
plan provided that a president be removed and "be  afterwards 
tried & punished . " 1 1 3 In addition to Hamilton ' s  view s ,  which are 
ambiguous and may reflect the holding power o f  one ' s  own 
ideas , we have the evidence from the state ratifying conventions , 
which has something for both sides of this debate . 1 14 
In such a state o f  affairs , it may be useful to consider both 
the logical and practical consequences of the argument . If a 
federal judge must be " convicted" and thus removed before he 
or she can be prosecuted, a judge who has been impeached but 
who is not , for whatever reason, convicted cannot be  prosecuted . 
Rather than belittle an interpretation o f  the Constitution that 
would lead, in such a case ,  to " complete and . . .  permanent 
immunity from criminal prosecution , " 1 1 5 I prefer to pose a ques-
" '  The punishment which may be the consequence of conviction upon im­
peachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. After 
having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and con­
fidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable 
to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 65,  supra note 42, at 20 (A. Hamilton) ; see id. No. 77,  at 97. 
1 12 Berger, supra note 1 08 ,  at 1 127 . 
"' 3 Farrand, supra note 34, at 625 . Berger asserts that Hamilton' s  plan "was not 
considered by the Convention . "  Berger, supra note 108,  at 1 1 27 . This may be misleading. 
Hamilton read to the delegates a sketch of his plan of government. See 1 Farrand, supra 
note 34, at 291 -93 . Moreover, " [a]lthough [his] plan was not formally before the Con­
vention in any way, several of the delegates made copies . "  3 id. at 6 1 7 . 
1 1 4 See Catz, Removal of Federal Judges by Imprisonment, 1 8  RuTGERS L. J .  103 ,  
1 04-05 n . 10 ( 1 986-87) . 
"' Memorandum for the United States at 9- 10,  Application of Spiro T .  Agnew, 
Civil No. 73-965 (D. Md.) ,  quoted in Berger, supra note 1 08 ,  at 1 1 3 3 .  In arguing that 
"impeachment never immunizes the individual from criminal proceedings , "  Note, supra 
note 105, at 442 , a recent commentator neglects differences between the purposes and 
reach of the impeachment process and the criminal process and thus neglects the possibility 
of immunity arising from the Senate' s  failure to convict. 
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tion . Is it possible that ,  in a provision designed to eliminate 
double j eopardy principles as a potential bar to the criminal 
prosecution (and punishment) of one convicted and removed 
through the impeachment process ,  the framers sought to bring, 
or inadvertently did bring , the same principles in through the 
back door , so as to protect one who has not been removed 
( " convicted " )  from criminal prosecution? 
Obviously , I intend the question as rhetorical , but the im­
plications of the answer for other permutations in the order of 
precedence suggest the wisdom of elaboration . As noted above , 
the Constitution breaks from the English practice of making the 
impeachment process an all purpose affair ,  at the end of which 
the individual might lose not only his office but his head . 1 1 6 The 
arguments for distinguishing conduct that may be criminal from 
conduct warranting impeachment and removal are ,  at least for 
me, compelling . 1 1 7 These arguments are confirmed by the view 
of early and distinguished commentators that the impeachment 
process and the criminal process serve different purposes , albeit 
the j urisdictions sometimes overlap . 1 1 8 In such a scheme, prin­
ciples of double jeopardy have no role to play . 1 1 9 Just as conduct 
need not be criminal to justify impeachment and removal , so 
the fact that conduct does not justify impeachment and removal 
does not mean that it is not criminal. 1 20 It is inconceivable to 
me, as it was to Justice Story, that the framers intended to bar 
the prosecution of one impeached but not convicted and thus 
1 1 6  See, e.g., P .  HoFFER & N.  HuLL ,  supra note 1 1 ,  at 1 - 1 4; 2 J .  STORY, supra note 
37 ,  §§ 780-83 ;  W. RA.wLE, supra note 37,  at 206-07 . 
1 1 7  See, e.g. , C. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 25-41 ( 1 974); Comm . on Fed. 
Legislation, The Law of Presidential Impeachment, 1 9  REc . A.B .  CITY N . Y .  1 54,  1 55-58 
( 1 974) [hereinafter The Law of Impeachment] . Professor Black supported (without elab­
orating) "the contention . . .  that an incumbent president cannot be put on trial in the 
ordinary courts for ordinary crime." C. BLACK, supra, at 40. But see Berger, supra note 
1 08 .  
1 1 '  See, e. g. ,  THE FEDERALIST No.  65 (A. Hamilton); W. RAWLE, supra note 37, at 
1 98-208; 2 J .  STORY, supra note 37 ,  at § §  744-45 , 747-48, 759, 762-64, 780-84, 788, 794-
95, 799 , 8 1 0; 1 THE WoRKS OF JAMEs WILSON,  supra note 34, at 324, 426 . 
1 19 See, e.g., 2 J .  STORY, supra note 37, at §§  779-84. This is not to say, however, 
that such principles would be inapplicable to an attempted impeachment of a person 
previously tried by the Senate. See id. at § 806. 
120 See supra text accompanying note 1 1 7 .  
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inconceivable that the Constitution should be read to require 
removal before prosecution . 1 2 1 
The second line of attack on criminal prosecution before 
removal is both narrower and broader than the first . It is nar­
rower because, at least in discriminating hands , it distinguishes 
between prosecution and conviction, on the one hand ,  and im­
prisonment on the other . 1 22 It is broader because,  of necessity, 
the argument must quickly depart the text of the Constitution . 
Such an argument , like the idea of equality , " [o]nce loosed . . .  
is not easily cabined . ' '  1 23 
In whatever hands , the attack requires acceptance o f  the 
proposition that the constitutionally prescribed impeachment 
process is the exclusive means to remove a federal j udge from 
o ffice . As indicated above , I accept that proposition ,  finding it 
either asserted or assumed by early commentators and confirmed 
by the verdict of history . 1 24 
Even if  one were persuaded that imprisonment , or impris­
onment for a long period ,  was tantamount to removal and thus 
constitutionally proscribed,  the conclusion would not follow that 
the criminal process is irrelevant in considering adjustments in 
current arrangements .  If the constitutional problem inheres only 
in the sentence, it should be possible,  with suitable amendments 
to Title 1 8 , 125 to postpone the execution of a sentence of con­
finement until such time, if ever , as a convicted j udge is im-
1 2 1  See 2 J .  STORY supra note 37 ,  at § §  779-85 . "But the ordinary tribunals . . .  are 
not precluded, either before or after an impeachment, from taking cognizance of the 
public and official delinquency ."  W. RAwLE, supra note 37 ,  at 204; see 2 THE DEBATES 
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
477 (J. Elliot ed. 1 836) (James Wilson opining to the Pennsylvania Convention that 
" [t]hongh they may not be convicted on impeachment before the Senate, they may be 
tried by their country. ") .  
122 Although rejecting Judge Hastings' attempt t o  quash the indictment against him, 
the court of appeals did "not address whether or under what circumstances an extended 
sentence of imprisonment might approach in substance removal from office . "  Hastings, 
68 1 F .2d at 7 1 2  n . 1 9 .  See United States v .  Claiborne, 790 F.2d 1 3 5 5 ,  1 356-58 (9th Cir. 
1 986) (Kozinski, J . ,  dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) ; Note, supra note 1 05 ,  
at 425-26. 
123 Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 9 1 ,  9 1  ( 1 966-67) . 
124 See supra text accompanying notes 35-38,  108 .  
1 25 See, e.g., 1 8  U.S .C .  § §  355 1 ,  3553 ,  356 1 -64 (Supp . I I I  1 985).  
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peached and removed . 1 26 As developed below , the record of the 
criminal trial could measurably diminish the burdens of the 
impeachment process , 1 27 and a legislative time limit on the du­
ration of any postponement might serve as an additional incen­
tive to Congress to proceed with dispatch . If Congress did not 
view the conduct undergirding the conviction as an impeachable 
offense ,  the judge could go free-as free as anyone who escapes 
confinement but not the rigors of the process that may lead to 
it-and prosecutors would know that not every confirmed pec­
cadillo of a federal judge would result in an empty bench , even 
temporarily . 
I am not , however , persuaded that imprisonment of a federal 
judge pursuant to a judgment of conviction,  even for a long 
term , would constitute "removal from office " under an appro­
priate constitutional analysi s .  I support functional analysis just 
as it supports me, 128 and once the notion of "removal from 
office" is freed from its constitutional context , I admit that it 
is as hard to defend imprisonment of a federal j udge as it is to 
defend the failure to reimburse an embattled federal j udge for 
legal expenses against a claim of diminished compensation . 1 29 
But what I have called the constitutional context is as clear for 
one as it is for the other . In the case of ' ' removal from office , ' '  
the framers had in mind the formal termination o f  a commission 
or of tenure in office. 1 30 Yes , they were concerned about j udicial 
1 2 6  Cf. C. BLACK, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 40-4 1 (suggesting indictment and delay of trial 
of incumbent president on assumptions that latter may not be tried while holding office 
and that crime charged not an impeachable offense). 
'27 See infra text accompanying notes 1 78-88 ,  230-32. 
128 See Hazard ,  Book Review, 87 YALE L . J .  1 284, 1 289 ( 1 977-78). 
1 2 9  Cf. Hastings, 829 F.2d at 1 03 (finding lack of exhaustion of administrative 
remedies as to claim that failure to pay or to reimburse expenses incurred in proceedings 
under 1 980 Act constituted diminution of compensation prohibited by art . I I I ,  § 1 ) .  
1 30 See THE FEDERALIST No. 65 , supra note 42, at 20 (A. Hamilton); id. N o .  77, at 
97 ; id. No. 79, at 108-09; 2 Farrand, supra note 34, at 64-69; see also W .  RAWLE, supra 
note 37 ,  at 207 ("They [courts of law] can neither remove nor disqualify the person 
convicted, and therefore the obnoxious officer might be continued in power and the 
injury sustained by the nation be renewed or increased . ") ;  id. at 208 ("A commission 
granted during good behavior can only be revoked by this mode of proceeding .") ;  2 J .  
STORY, supra note 37 , § 782, at 25 1 ("In England, the judgment upon impeachments is 
not confined to mere removal from office; but extends to the whole punishment attached 
by law to the offense . ") ;  id. at § 784 ("In the ordinary course of the administration of 
criminal justice, no court is authorized to remove, or disqualify an offender, as a part 
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independence, and yes , the Constitution should b e  interpreted 
so as to accommodate situations unforeseen or unforeseeable in 
1 787 . 1 3 1 But criminal proceedings were not a threat to j udicial 
independence unknown to the framers , and ,  I have argued, they 
were not a threat the framers deemed serious enough to fore­
close . I conclude,  therefore , that a federal j udge can be both 
prosecuted and imprisoned without prior resort to the impeach­
ment process . 
This does not mean that ,  as citizens , we should not be 
concerned about the threat that unrestrained prosecution of  fed­
eral judges would pose to their independence . Over the long 
term , prosecutors seem to have entered the scene only in extreme 
cases , 1 32 although recently there have been charges of prosecu­
torial abuse . 1 33 In general , there are institutional considerations 
and safeguards that would tend to reign in zealous federal in­
vestigators and prosecutors 1 34 and numerous formal safeguards 
available to federal judges as "ordinary citizens . " 1 35 Moreover,  
even if federal trial and appellate j udges cannot always be counted 
on to see the forest of j udicial independence for an unpopular 
tree , 1 36 that they would usually do so seems a fair assumption . 
I can think of no reason why an individual federal j udge should 
have different (i . e . , additional) defenses to an indictment , once 
returned , than does an ordinary citizen . Surely the Justice De­
partment should not ignore the word of  an informant that a 
federal j udge is on the take; nor , in my view , should it rest 
content with civil remedies for the income tax evasion of a 
federal j udge ,  as it might of  a j anitor. But these are matters for 
of its regular judgment. If it results at all, it results as a consequence, and not as a part 
of the sentence .") ;  1 THE WoRKs OF JAMEs WILSON , supra note 34, at 325-26. 
1 3 1  The framers did consider and reject one form of "temporary removal , "  but it 
too would have been a formal action, proposed in a motion "that persons impeached be 
suspended from their office until they be tried and acquitted ."  2 Farrand, supra note 34, 
at 6 1 2 . 
132 See supra text accompanying notes 57,  1 02-04. 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 765 F .2d 784 (9th Cir. 1 985),  cert. denied, 
106 S .  Ct. 1 636 ( 1 986); see also infra text accompanying notes 1 85-88. 
1 3 4  See Weingarten, Judicial Misconduct: A View from the Department of Justice, 
76 KY.  L .J .  799, 804-05 ( 1 987-88) .  
1 3 5  Claiborne, 727 F .2d at 848. 
1 36 Cf H . R .  REP . No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38 ,  at 14  (means to prevent "one group of 
federal judges arbitrarily 'ganging up' [on] or ' hazing' another judge") .  
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policymaking , and they may be a subject for congressional in­
qmry . 
Neither of the institutional considerations mentioned above 
is fair ground for assumption in prosecutions under state law . 
That is a matter deserving of discrete historical inquiry 1 37 and 
constitu tiona! analysis .  
Let us  assume that federal investigators and prosecutors 
pursue possible violations of federal criminal law by article III  
j udges with circumspection and awareness of the potential costs 
of an erroneous exercise of prosecutorial discretion. In consid­
ering adjustments in current arrangements ,  the question becomes 
whether it is possible to enhance the usefulness of the criminal 
process without affording irrelevant incentives to the enforce­
ment of criminal laws against federal j udges . 
I believe that it is possible to enhance the usefulness of  the 
criminal process to the impeachment process by adopting rules 
or practices in the H ouse, and perhaps in the Senate, that accord 
substantial preclusive effect to factual findings necessary to a 
criminal conviction once that conviction has been affirmed on 
appeal . The matter is best discussed, however , in connection 
with adjustments in the impeachment process and will be de­
ferred to that point . 1 38 
I also believe that automatically according preclusive effect 
either to factual findings or to a conviction per se would intro­
duce irrelevant incentives to the enforcement of criminal laws 
against federal judges and, for that and other reasons , should 
be avoided . Again , the matter is  best discussed in the context in 
which decisions on it will be made, and it is to that context that 
I now turn . 
E. The Impeachment Process 
Before discussing possible adjustments in the current arrange­
ments for impeachment and trial , it is important to state and 
1 37 Judge Manton's downfall came as a result of  a state criminal investigation, 
although he was prosecuted by federal authorities . According to Joseph Borkin, "District 
Attorney [Thomas E . ]  Dewey . . .  made it abundantly clear that if the Federal government 
would not act under Federal criminal statutes, he would proceed under state law . "  J .  
BoRKIN, supra note 16 ,  at 28. 
1 38 See infra text accompanying notes 1 78-84, 230-32. 
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briefly to defend a few premises or  assumptions from which the 
discussion proceeds .  
I assume, because I have been convinced , that m ost questions 
of substance arising in connection with an impeachment inquiry 
by the House or a trial on articles of impeachment by the Senate 
are not subj ect to j udicial review . Again , the verdict o f  history 
weighs heavily . 1 3 9  M oreover, the arguments to the contrary 140 
have been exhaustively, and in my view convincingly , refuted . 1 4 1  
Only one set of arguments,  based on relatively recent authority, 
deserves attention here . 
Whatever one thinks of Powell v .  McCormack, 1 42 it is hard 
to imagine a more ' ' textually demonstrable  c onst i tut ional  
commitment" 143 of  the  exclusive power to determine matters of 
substance than the Constitution' s  commitment to the H ouse of 
Representatives o f  "the sole Power of Impeachment , "144 and to 
the Senate of "the sole Power to try all Impeachments . "  1 45 
Moreover , the evidence of the framers ' intent to pretermit the 
involvement of the courts in the process not only supports that 
conclusion ; 146 it also supports the conclusion that on matters o f  
substance the process requires decisions for which there is  ' ' a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards " and 
1 3 9  Apparently the only attempt to secure judicial review of the impeachment process 
in our history was unsuccessful. Ritter v. United States, 84 Ct. Cl. 293 ( 1 936) , cert. 
denied, 300 U.S .  668 ( 1 937). Early commentators on the Constitution asserted or assumed 
that there was no judicial appeal from, or review of, the impeachment process . See W. 
RA WLE, supra note 37 ,  a t  208 ; 2 J .  STORY, supra note 37 ,  at § §  764, 803 . 
140 See, e.g., R .  BERGER, supra note 35 ,  103-2 1 .  
14 1  See, e.g. , C .  BLACK, supra note 1 17 ,  at 53-63 ; Goldstein, Memorandum III on 
the Effect of the End of a Congress and Start of a New Congress on a Pending 
Impeachment Proceeding: Judicial Review of These Questions, in SENATE CoMM. ON 
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION, 93D CoNo. ,  2D SEss. ,  IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLANEous Doc­
UMENTS 1 67-204 (Comm. Print 1 974) [hereinafter IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLANEOUS Docu­
MENTS] ; The Law of Impeachment, supra note 1 17 ,  at 1 67-70; Goldberg, A n  Essay on 
Raoul Berger's Thesis for Judicial Intervention in the Process of the Removal of the 
President of the United States, 1 975 WISCONSIN L. REv. 4 14 .  
142 395 U .S .  486 ( 1 969) . 
143 Baker v .  Carr, 369 U .S .  1 86 ,  2 17  (1 962); see Powell, 395 U .S .  at 5 1 8-48 . 
144 U.S. CaNST. art. I ,  § 2 .  
145 !d. at § 3 .  
146 See THE FEDERALIST No.  65 (A . Hamilton); 2 Farrand, supra note 34,  at 500, 
5 5 1 ;  Eilberg, The Investigation by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 
Representatives into the Charges of Impeachable Conduct Against Richard M. Nixon ,  48 
TEMPLE L.Q.  209, 230-3 1  { 1975). 
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some o f  which necessarily involve " an initial policy determina­
tion of a kind clearly for nonj udicial discretion . ' '  147 Perhaps 
there could or should be judicial review of a decision to impeach 
or to remove a federal j udge for conduct (or inaction) that was 
avowedly not considered "Treason , Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors " 148 by the House or Senate , but that will 
presumably never occur . 
As to matters of procedure , the question is more compli­
cated .  The Constitution ' s  textual commitment to each H ouse of 
the discretion to " determine the Rules of its Proceedings , "  1 49 
lacks the word ' ' sole ' '  and in that respect is similar to the 
companion provision that " [e] ach H ouse shall be the Judge of 
the . . .  Qualifications of its own Members, " 150 which was at 
issue in Powell. It has long been clear in other contexts that ,  
when rules of Congress o r  o f  its committees are supported only 
by reference to this provision of the Constitution, such rules are 
"judicially cognizable , " 1 5 1  although judicial scrutiny (as opposed 
to construction) is limited to consistency with the Constitution 
and preservation of fundamental rights . 1 52 
14' Baker, 369 U.S .  at 2 17 ;  see Powell, 395 U . S .  at 548-49. 
�he necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally 
dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by 
such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense by the prosecutors, 
or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit 
the discretion of courts in favor of personal security . . .  The awful discre­
tion which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to 
honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished char­
acters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small 
number of persons. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 42 , at 19 (A. Hamilton); see W. RAWLE, supra note 
37, at 201 -03 ; 2 J. STORY, supra note 37, at §§ 743-73 ,  784; 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON, supra note 34, at 324. 
1 48  U.S.  CaNST. art. I I ,  § 4. The same may be true of an attempt to extend a 
judgment beyond "removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States , "  the limits stated id. at art. I ,  
§ 3 ,  cl. 7 .  
I n  this discussion, I assume a federal court with subject matter jurisdiction. But see 
C. BLACK, supra note 1 1 7, at 55-6 1 . 
149 U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 5 ,  cl. 2.  
"0 !d. at cl . 1 .  
" 1 Yellin v .  United States, 374 U.S .  1 09, 1 14 ( 1 963). 
1 5 2  See United States v .  Smith, 286 U .S .  6, 33 ( 1 932) ; United States v .  Ballin, 1 44 
u . s .  1, 5 ( 1 892). 
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In the impeachment context , the Constitution contains a 
number of specific procedural requirements for a Senate trial , 
disregard of which perhaps should be reviewable by a federal 
court possessed of subj ect matter j urisdiction . 1 53 To complicate 
matters further , although early commentators on the impeach­
ment process sometimes extended reasoning about the inappro­
priateness of j u di ci ally created standards to m atters o f  
procedure, 1 54 Justice Story at least was hopelessly inconsistent 
on that subject . 1 55 
If that were all , one might conclude that there is no consti­
tutional or prudential barrier to judicial review o f  the procedures 
employed by the H ouse and Senate in the impeachment process .  
I t  i s  not all , however , even passing the implications o f  the  other 
elements of the political question doctrine for the resolution o f  
the issue . Some h ave relied o n  the common sense view that 
" procedural decisions will inevitably be tied to j udgments on 
the merits , "  1 56 that in other words even limited j udicial control 
of procedure could vitiate exclusive congressional control of  
substance . I would add to that common sense view the  formal 
argument that , apart from article I ,  section 5 ,  the grants of the 
power to impeach and of the power to try impeachments include 
inherent powers to determine the rules for those respective pro­
ceedings , and that if the greater powers are exclusive, so are the 
lesser1 57-subject only to j udicial review for consistency with 
specific procedural directives in the Constitution . As for Justice 
1 53 See U . S .  CaNST . art. I ,  § 3 ,  cl. 6 (senators on oath or affirmation; Chief Justice 
presides when President tried; conviction requires concurrence of two thirds of members 
present . ) .  
1 54 See W .  RAWLE, supra note 37 ,  at  201 . 
155 Compare 2 J .  STORY, supra note 37 , at § 763 with id. at § §  796-97 . 
1 56 The Law of Impeachment, supra note 1 17 ,  at 1 70.  
157 Ancillary to the sole power of impeachment vested in the H ouse and the 
power to try impeachments vested in the Senate is the power to govern the 
timing and the extent of discovery that will be allowed. The doctrine of the 
separation of powers that denies a court the power to enjoin impeachment 
also denies a court the power to dictate how the impeachment proceedings 
shall be conducted. See Mississippi v. Johnson,  7 1  U .S .  (4 Wall . )  at 501 
(dictum) . 
In Re Grand Jury Proceedings of Grand Jury No. 8 1 - 1 (Miami), 669 F .  Supp. at 1 078;  
cf. Coleman v .  Miller, 307 U . S .  433 ,  456-60 ( 1 939) (Black, J . ,  concurring) (exclusive 
control over amendment process includes steps leading to determination that amendment 
has been adopted). 
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Story , we should recognize that he was not directly addressing 
the question that concerns us and that the source of his incon­
sistency was an argument pitched to another audience,  in favor 
of his campaign for federal common law . 1 58 
I also assume that freedom from judicial review on most 
matters of substance and procedure in the impeachment process 
does not entail the freedom of members of Congress to ignore 
those parts (that is , most) of the Constitution that are not 
specifically addressed to the process . 1 59 I assume that , as consci­
entious legislators , 160 members of Congress will endeavor to de­
fine the applicability of constitutional requirements announced 
in other contexts to the impeachment process and that they will 
endeavor to ensure that their proceedings and decisions comport 
with the constitutional norms thus determined . 
1 .  Impeachment by the House of Representatives 
In  1 980 testimony concerning legislative proposals in the field 
of federal judicial discipline, Representative Rodino recalled that ,  
when the resolutions impeaching President Nixon were referred 
to the H ouse Judiciary Committee , ' 'we were forced to proceed 
with virtually no guideposts " 161 and that the Committee " created 
almost from whole cloth a procedure for conducting our inquiry 
and resolving each of the myriad problems we encountered . " 162 
In that regard,  Rodino "recommend [ed] that we on the Judiciary 
Committee consider improvements in the way in which we handle 
158 See 2 J .  STORY, supra note 37 ,  at § §  796-97; Jay, Origins of Federal Common 
Law: Part Two, 1 33 U. PA. L. REv. 1 23 1 ,  1 294- 1 300 ( 1 984-85) . Story' s  view that the 
common law "regulate[d] ,  interpret[ed] ,  and control[led] the powers and duties of the 
court of impeachment, "  2 J .  STORY, supra note 37,  at § 796, was no more inconsistent 
with his belief that courts were "exempt[ed] . . .  from all participation in, and control 
over,"  id. at § 764, the impeachment process, than is the view taken below that the 
House and Senate are bound by the Constitution, although their interpretations of its 
requirements are not subject to judicial review . 
1 59 See C. BLACK, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 23-24; Goldstein, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 1 87-89. 
160 See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 ( 1 974-75). 
161 Judicial Tenure and Discipline 1979-80: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Cong . ,  1 st & 2d Sess . 127 ( 1 980). 
162 !d. at 128 .  
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complaints against judges " with a view toward " ch anges in the 
rules for the review and disposal of  complaints . "  1 63 
In the House Report on the bill that ,  as amended , became 
the 1 980 Act , the House Judiciary Committee stated that it had 
" acted to firm up its impeachment authority by referring all 
complaints against federal j udges to a single subcommittee (the 
Subcommittee on Courts ,  Civil Liberties and the Administration 
of Justice) . "  1 64 Moreover , the Committee expressed willingness 
' ' to improve its oversight over federal j udges and . . .  to consider 
improvements in the way that it handles complaints against 
j udges . "  1 65 
The House Judiciary Committee , acting through the Subcom­
mittee on Courts , Civil Liberties and the Administration of  
Justice, unquestionably has "improve[d] its oversight over fed­
eral j udges . "  1 66 But , although impeachment proceedings are not 
without guideposts, in the form of a collection of precedents ,  167 
they are not in most respects governed by general rules . 1 68 It is 
true that in a changing political body like the House of Repre­
sentatives , 169 rules cannot ever be a source of long-term expec­
tations ; indeed , even short-term expectations are subj ect to 
frustration by changes in the rules during a session . It is also 
true that in some respects every impeachment inquiry is sui 
generis ,  but it is not clear that the observation suffices as a 
normative defense of  ad hoc procedure . 
A number of problems exist with the H ouse' s  approach to 
impeachment inquiries . First , most of  the preced ents available 
163 !d. at 1 29. 
164 H.R.  REP. No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38, at 5 .  
165 !d. at 20. 
1 66  See Oversight Hearing, supra note 8 ;  Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 
62, at 1 4. 
1 67 See IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45 , at 57-
72, 687-740, 765-7 1 .  In addition, rules have been adopted for the conduct of specific 
impeachment inquiries. See, e.g., Firmage & Mangrum, Removal of the President: Res­
ignation and the Procedural Law of Impeachment,  1 974 DUKE L . J .  1 023 , 1 109- 1 0  (pro­
cedural rules for the Nixon impeachment inquiry). 
1 68 Presumably, however , an impeachment inquiry is subject to any applicable rules 
of the House and of the House Judiciary Committee. See, e.g., H . R . R .  XI(2)(K) (inves­
tigative hearing procedures), reprinted in CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES 
OF THE HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H . R .  Doc . No.  279 ,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess. 434-36 
( 1 987) [hereinafter H . R .  Doc. No. 279] . 
169 See Gojack v .  United States , 384 U .S .  702, 707 n .4  ( 1 966) . 
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as " guideposts " are at least fifty years old , and the two of most 
recent vintage were indeed sui generis in consequential respects . 1 70 
Second , even if  that were not the case,  and in a body whose 
membership is relatively transient , exclusive resort to precedents 
for procedural guidance would involve inefficient duplication of 
effort . Third , guideposts can point in different directions , pro­
viding opportunity for argument about the proper direction, and 
hence occasioning delay . 1 7 1 
Rules need not be inflexible, and if the label is important 
for political purposes , they need not even be called rules . 1 72 
Whether , however , the preferred label is " rules , "  "guidelines , "  
"standards , "  or even " distillation o f  practice , "  the need is for 
a body of general procedural directives available at the start of 
an impeachment inquiry and presumptively applicable to the 
conduct of that inquiry . The goal of the exercise would not be 
to create or to honor expectations , except perhaps the expecta­
tion that ,  as conscientious legislators , members of the House 
have given sustained thought to their constitutional responsibil­
ities . The goal would be to prevent the rule of a graveyard on 
the one hand or of an immaculate conception on the other , as 
well as to reduce the costs , delays , and opportunities for tactical 
maneuvering inherent in a regime o f  procedural adhockery. 1 73 
170 I refer to the impeachment inquiries concerning former President Nixon and 
Judge Claiborne. The rules adopted for the Nixon inquiry, see supra note 1 67 ,  may not 
be a good general model-indeed they may cause mischief-because of the special pro­
cedural solicitude shown for a president. The Claiborne inquiry, on the other hand, was 
circumscribed because of his criminal conviction. See infra text accompanying notes 1 78-
94. 
17 1 See �upra note 1 70.  
1 72 "Those who prefer discretion to rules on particular subjects are often victims of 
the widespread misimpression that rules are necessarily inconsistent with discretion; guid­
ing rules and rules with escape clauses are not inconsistent with discretion. " 2 K .  DAVIS, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 1 86 (2d ed . 1 979) (emphasis in original) . 
173 Cf Burbank, supra note 7, at 324-25 ("skeletal rulemaking promotes inefficiency 
as well as uncertainty") .  
In the context of impeachment, a member of the House could object that the 
adoption of general rules might invite judicial review. Cf Senate Rules, supra note 2 1 ,  
at 27 (Senator Byrd questions whether specifying burden o f  persuasion in the Senate 
Rules would invite an attempt to secure judicial review) . But it is unclear to me why 
general rules are different in that respect from rules adopted for a specific inquiry, see 
supra note 167,  and as to both I do not believe judicial review is available. See supra 
text accompanying notes 149-58 .  
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Although panic at the prospect of the impeachment process 
running its course has been most noticeable in the Senate,  there 
is cleaning to be done in both Houses . 
Subcommittees have a peculiar history in the House of Rep­
resentatives . 1 74 It may therefore seem churlish , or at least naive, 
to note the recent departures from the House Judiciary Com­
mittee's effort ' ' to firm up its impeachment authority by refer­
ring all complaints against federal j udges to a single subcommittee 
(the Subcommittee on Courts ,  Civil Liberties and the Adminis­
tration of Justice) . "  175 Whatever the cause of those departures , 
one of them has elicited unwarranted and unfair speculation 
about the likely results of the current investigation o f  Judge 
Hastings . 1 76 More generally, considerations similar to those sup­
porting the argument for rules or guidelines also  support giving 
to one subcommittee the initial responsibility of conducting an 
impeachment investigation . 1 77 
Finally in connection with the House ' s  role in the impeach­
ment process , I return to the question of increasing the useful­
ness of criminal law enforcement without creating irrelevant 
incentives for law enforcement officials . In its report recom­
mending the resolution impeaching Judge Claiborne, the House 
Judiciary Committee observed that " [t]here was no need for an 
independent finding of facts about Judge Claiborne' s  conduct 
by the Committee, " 1 78 because they had " already been found 
under a judicial procedure which afforded the respondent full 
174 See THE RALPH NADER CoNGRESs PROJECT, THE J uDICIARY CoMMITTEES 32-57, 
367-83 ( 1 97 5). 
1 7 5  H . R. REP. No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38, at 5. The Hastings inquiry was referred to 
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice . See Marcus, Congress Reluctantly Takes up 
Hastings' Ouster, Legal Times , March 30, 1 987 , at 2 .  The Nixon inquiry was referred to 
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights. See supra note 4 .  
176 A number o f  people with whom I have discussed the Hastings inquiry assume 
that he will not be impeached because the Chair of the Subcommittee, Representative 
Conyers, is, like Judge Hastings, a black.  It is sad that, with Judge Hastings leveling 
charges of racism at the likes of Judge Frank Johnson and John Doar, see, e.g. , Taylor, 
Top Panel Urges Congress to Weigh Ousting of Judge, N.Y.  Times, M arch 1 8 , 1 987, at 
A 1 ,  some interested observers thereby convict themselves of that charge.  See Marcus, 
supra note 175 ,  at 2 .  
177 See supra text accompanying notes 167-73 . Workload i s ,  however, a weighty 
countervailing consideration . See Greenhouse, Judicial Impeachment: Its Process Anti­
quated?, N.Y. Times, May 1 1 ,  1 988,  at A22 .  
178 H . R .  REP. No. 688, 99th Cong . ,  2 d  Sess . 2 4  ( 1 986) . 
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due process rights . "  179 The Committee noted , however , that it 
had ' ' nonetheless through the hearing process and subsequent 
deliberations , examined the facts and circumstances supporting 
the jury verdict and conviction of Judge Claiborne.  " 1 80 I n  sum, 
[a] fter completing its factual examination, the Commi ttee con­
cluded that , where a complete and final record of  adj udicated 
proceedings leading to a guilty verdict is  before it , the Com­
mittee is j ustified in taking action analogous to the concept of  
"judicial notice , "  but  in  a legisl ative setting . That i s ,  the  
factual findings have already been made by a unanimous j ury 
beyond a reasonable doubt . 1 8 1 
In my view , the Committee was on the right track, although I 
do not find the suggested analogy of ' 'judicial notice ' ' as helpful 
as that of issue preclusion. 1 82 More important , at the time o f  the 
Committee ' s  inquiry,  Judge Claiborne had exhausted all avenues 
of direct appeal , but his collateral attack on the conviction was 
still pending. 1 83 I n  the absence o f  affirmance on appeal-such a 
case may never arise-I doubt that it would be appropriate even 
for the House to accord preclusive effect to the factual findings 
necessarily implicit in a guilty verdict . At least it would not seem 
appropriate if an appeal were pending that included claims o f  
error casting doubt o n  the evidentiary foundation of the verdict 
or on the integrity of the fact-finding process . In addition,  when 
a collateral attack on a conviction is pending , it may be that the 
House should consider whether success in that effort would cast 
doubt on the factual predicate for its deliberations . Finally , in  
either event , attention should be given to the question, i f  and 
when it ever arises, whether the H ouse should consider claims 
1 79 !d. 
ISO fd. 
181  !d. 
1 82 See Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S. J. Res. 370, supra note 5 ,  at 34 (statement of 
Stephen B.  Burbank); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 ( 1 982). Although the 
pendency of an appeal would not deprive a judgment of finality for purposes of issue 
preclusion under the Restatement, see id. at § 13 comment f, I argue below for a different 
rule in this context. Note, however, the suggestion that " [i]t may be appropriate to 
postpone decision of [the] question [of preclusion] until the proceedings addressed to the 
judgment are concluded . "  !d. 
183 See H .R.  REP. No . 688, supra note 1 78 ,  at 1 9-20. 
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of error implicating the trier ' s  fact-finding that were not made 
in judicial proceedings . 1 84 
In this only modestly revised account of the appropriate 
procedure for the conduct of an impeachment inquiry in the 
case of a convicted felon, I have sought to be careful  in describ­
ing both those claims of error that , in my view, might justify 
the failure to accord preclusive effect to the judgment of con­
viction and the circumstances in which that might be appropri­
ate .  In the Claiborne inquiry , the subcommittee to which the 
resolution of impeachment was referred originally limited the 
scope of its inquiry . 1 85 Ultimately, Judge Claiborne's  counsel was 
permitted ' ' to present arguments outside the scope, ' '  and he 
" discussed the entire chain of events that preceded Judge Clai­
borne' s  first trial . " 186 Because the matter was one " of first 
impression for the Committee on the Judiciary, "  187 and partic­
ularly in light of the suggested qualifications to the Committee ' s  
stated conclusions developed above , how can one cavil at  the 
subcommittee' s  decision? The appearance of fairness is  in the 
eye of the beholder, and in any event , the incremental costs of 
achieving i t  in  a House inquiry that is otherwise suitably circum­
scribed may seem trivial. Perhaps , but the notion of "costs " 
also may vary with the observer . The costs of permitting a 
convicted felon to raise claims of error that have nothing to do 
with the facts or the fact-finding process may one day include 
. letting the j udge remain in office because the constable blun-
dered . Even on the unlikely assumption that the Senate is bound 
to dismiss or that it should dismiss articles of impeachment 
because of conduct of law enforcement officials that does not 
implicate the fact-finding process,  1 88 in my view evidence of such 
conduct is irrelevant in the House's  deliberations . 
IS4 The use of rules of issue preclusion by analogy would suggest an affirmative 
answer to this question .  See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 1 82 ,  at § 
27 comment e .  
1 85 H.R. REP . No. 688,  supra note 178 ,  at 4.  
1 86  /d. at 5 .  
187 /d. at 24. 
188 The Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, see infra text accompanying notes 
202- 10,  
granted,  to a substantial extent, a motion by the House to exclude, as 
irrelevant , evidence of alleged judicial and prosecutorial misconduct . . . .  
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Although , I have argued , the House Judiciary Committee 
was on the right track in according preclusive effect to the 
findings of fact necessarily implicit in the j ury ' s  verdict convict­
ing Judge Claiborne , it seemingly lost its way in formulating the 
third article of impeachment . According to that article, the facts 
that Judge Claiborne was found guilty of the crime of making 
and subscribing a false income tax return and ,  following j udg­
ment of conviction entered on the verdict , was sentenced to 
imprisonment and a fine were sufficient grounds for a conclusion 
that he was "guilty of misbehavior and . . .  of high crimes . "  1 89 
The problem with the third article in the Claiborne matter 
is not only that it may suggest no role for the House (or the 
Senate) in examining the factual underpinnings of a criminal 
conviction .  The article, as explained in the Committee ' s  report , 
reflects the view that conviction of a felony is an impeachable 
offense . 190 That view, if accepted , would constitute a self-in­
flicted wound , depriving our elected representatives of the duty 
and hence opportunity to exercise judgment on the extent of 
overlap between the prohibitions of a temporary maj ority and 
the prohibitions of a supra-maj ority , between sins against the 
commonwealth and those against the common weal . If accepted ,  
the premise o f  the third article would also constitute a n  irrelevant 
In that ruling the Committee decided to permit, and the Committee subse­
quently did hear, testimony relating to Judge Claiborne's allegation that 
government agents had influenced the testimony of witnesses . 
S. REP .  No. 5 1 1 ,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  2 ( 1986). Although the full Senate voted not to 
hear additional witnesses, 1 32 CoNG. REc . S 1 5 ,557 (daily ed . Oct . 8, 1 986), the alleged 
misconduct played a large part in the arguments presented to that body by Judge Claiborne 
and his counsel . See id. at S 1 5 ,485-87 , S 1 5 ,496-503 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1 986) (statement of 
Mr. Goodman); id. at S 1 5 ,503-05 (statement of Judge Claiborne) . In fact, because the 
arguments preceded the vote, they may have made it closer than it might otherwise have 
been. See infra note 208 . In any event, many senators were troubled by Judge Claiborne's 
allegations. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE rN THE IMPEACHMENT 
TRJAL OF HARRY E. CLAIBORNE, A JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 
THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA, S. Doc . N o .  48,  99th Cong . ,  2d' Sess . 303 ( 1 986) [hereinafter 
CLAIBORNE IMPEACHMENT TRJAL] (statement of Sen . Bingaman); id. at 3 1 6- 1 7  (statement 
of Sen . Pryor) ; id. at 3 1 7  (statement of Sen . Heflin); id. at 339 (statement of Sen . 
McConnell); id. at 365 (statement of Sen . Levin); id. at 37 1 (statement of Sen . Gore). 
1 89 1 32 CoNG . REc . H47 1 1  (daily ed. July 22 , 1986) . 
190 See H . R .  REP . No. 688 , supra note 178 ,  at 22-23 . Another problem with the 
third article, which I do not pursue, is its reference to "misbehavior , "  as if "good 
behavior" were anything more than a definition of tenure. 
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incentive to the enforcement of criminal laws against federal 
judges , tempting federal (and state?) law enforcement officials 
to inquire whether the unpopular , eccentric, or otherwise suspi­
cious federal judge had perhaps ever poisoned her neighbor ' s  
cat . t 9 t 
In both respects , the third article of impeachment in the 
Claiborne matter s h ares  d e fects of proposed c o nst itut ional  
amendments that matter also has inspired . 1 92 H appily, j ust as 
the Senate failed to convict on the third article , 1 93 it has not 
pursued the proposed amendments beyond hearings at which 
they were roundly (and squarely) criticized . 1 94 
2 .  Trial in the Senate 
One need not be a cynic to understand why the prospect of 
a trial on articles of impeachment is a source o f  consternation 
in the Senate , at least when the individual impeached is the j udge 
of an inferior federal court . 1 95 The Senate's legislative business 
is so demanding, by reason of both volume and importance, 
that any trial , particularily a protracted trial , before that body 
may seem a luxury we can no longer afford . 1 96 That in any event 
is the view animating some of the recently proposed constitu­
tional amendments . 
191 Certainly, it is not envisaged that there should be automatic removal of 
an Article III judge for something less than commission of a serious crime. 
Yet, how can one be sure that all federal , and particularly all state felonies 
fall within that class. For example, can it be said that the conviction of any 
one of the following felonies is so serious that a sitting Article I I I  judge 
should automatically lose his or her office: destruction of a mailbox, 1 8  
U.S .C.  § 1705 ; mailing of a firearm declared nonmailable b y  statute, 1 8  
U.S .C.  § 1 7 1 5 ;  poisoning of an animal owned by another, Idaho Code § 
1 8-2 1 0 1 ( 1 9) ;  or adultery, id. § 1 8-6601 . 
Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S. J. Res. 3 70, supra note 5 ,  at 17  (statement of Hon. J .  
Clifford Wallace); see id. at 3 5 ,  4 3  (statement o f  Stephen B .  Burbank) . 
192 See supra text accompanying notes 5 ,  1 9 1 .  
193 1 32 CoNG. REc . S 1 5 ,761 (daily ed . Oct . 9 ,  1 986). 
194 See Hearing on S. J. Res. 364 & S.J. Res. 3 70, supra note 5 .  
195 " [O]f [Judge Weinstein] one can say, after Justice Jackson: 'He is not non-final 
because he is inferior, but he is inferior only because he is non-final . '  " Burbank ,  The 
Chancellor's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L .  REv. __ , __ ( 1 988) (footnote omitted) (forth­
coming). 
190 See supra text accompanying note 69; McConnell, Reflections on the Senate 's 
Role in the Judicial Impeachment Process and Proposals for Change, 76 KY. L . J .  739 
( 1 987 -88) . 
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Unfortunately , the Senate seems never seriously to have con­
sidered adj ustments in its own arrangements and only dimly to 
perceive that other arrangements might obviate the need to resort 
to the last line of defense against judicial misbehavior . I hope 
to have clarified the latter perception . It  remains to address 
possible revisions in the final act . 
Unlike the H ouse, the Senate does have a set of general rules 
applicable to trials on articles of impeachment . But these rules 
have changed very little during the last one hundred and twenty 
years . One consequential amendment , authorizing the taking of 
evidence by a committee of less than the whole,  was advocated 
at least thirty years before it was accepted . Once accepted , it 
was not availed of when an opportunity arose within a year , 
although it was employed, as amended , at the next opportunity­
fifty years later . Revision of the Senate's  rules has been a child 
of  the moment , and the moment seems usually to have been the 
eve of trial , with the result that the project aborted or the 
gestation period was too short to permit full development . Most 
recently , the Senate simply adopted . 197 
It is not my purpose in this Essay to review the Senate ' s  
rules in detail . The existing literature ,  most of it dating from 
the mid- 1 970s , identifies the issues to be addressed, whether or 
not one agrees with the authors' analyses or policy preferences . 198 
In addition, although the Senate Rules Committee circumscribed 
the scope of its reconsideration of the rules in 1 974, the hearings 
that informed its modest recommendations (not adopted until 
1 986) are a valuable resource . 199 Valuable too are papers com­
missioned in anticipation of a trial on articles impeaching Pres­
ident Nixon that treat issues of concern in any revision. 200 Finally, 
a fresh look at revising the Senate ' s  rules should consider how 
the rules have operated in practice and what has been the practice 
197 See S .  Res. 48 1 ,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  ( 1 986) ; supra text accompanying notes 2 1 -
28 .  
198 See, e.g., Firmage & Mangrum, supra note 1 67 ;  Futterman, supra note 2 1 ;  
Williams, The Historical and Constitutional Bases for the Senate 's Power t o  Use Masters 
or Committees to Receive Evidence in Impeachment Trials, 50 N.Y.U.  L .  REV . 5 1 2  
( 1 975). 
199 See Senate Rules, supra note 2 1 . 
20  See IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLANEous DocUMENTS, supra note 14 1 ,  at 1 67-204. 
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in the absence of rules . The Senate too has precedents201 but 
only one in the last fifty years and it unique in the history of 
Senate trials . 
For my limited purpose the contemporaneity rather than the 
uniqueness of the trial of Judge Claiborne would probably be 
determinative . No matter , for what was unique in that trial may 
have to become the norm if Senators are to be  persuaded (as­
suming they should be persuaded) not to flee the field . 
Added in 1 93 5  and revised in 1 986 ,2°2 Rule XI provides for 
the appointment by the presiding officer , " if  the Senate so 
orders , "  of a committee of senators " to receive evidence and to 
take testimony. "203 Subj ect to contrary order by the Senate,  a 
committee thus appointed functions as the Senate would , with 
the same powers and under the same rules , in  gathering evi­
dence . 204 When considering the transcript of a committee ' s  pro­
ceedings,  however , the Senate retains the right to (re)consider 
questions of admissibility of evidence, as well as the rights to 
hear the testimony of any witness ' ' in  open Senate ' '  and ,  indeed , 
to have "the entire trial in open Senate .  "205 Moreover , the Senate 
does not receive any recommendations from a committee ap­
pointed under Rule XI,  and it is therefore wholly unconstrained , 
as well as unguided, by the referral in determining the probative 
value of evidence that it deems admissible.  206 
Some commentators207 and legislators ,Z08 and even a federal 
201 See, e.g. , IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 
73-685, 773-850. 
202 The revisions were precisely those recommended in 1 974. See supra text accom­
panying notes 22, 28 . 
203 RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACH­
MENT TRIALS XI , 1 32 CoNG.  REc . S l 1 ,902 {daily ed . Aug. 1 5 ,  1 986) . 
204 See id. 
2os Id. 
206 See id. ; Goldstein, Memorandum II on the Effect of the End of a Congress and 
Start of a New Congress on a Pending Impeachment Proceeding: The Senate Trial, in 
IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLANEOUS DoCUMENTS, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 1 56-60. 
207 See, e.g., No Time for Shortcuts, Nat' !  L . J .  Oct. 20, 1 986, at 1 2, col . l .  
208 See, e. g., Heflin , In Wake of Claiborne Trial- Who Should Judge the Judges?, 
Legal Times, Dec. 1 5 ,  1 986, at 13 [hereinafter Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial] , 
reprinted in 1 33 CoNG . REc . S4990-91  (daily ed. Apr . 9, 1 987); Heflin , The Impeachment 
Process: Modernizing an A rchaic System, 71 JUDICATURE 1 23 ,  1 23-24 ( 1 987) [hereinafter 
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j udge , 209 have criticized the use of a committee to take evidence 
at the Claiborne trial , and some doubt that the procedure is 
constitutional . 2 1 0  Doubts on that score can only skew the consid­
eration of alternatives to current arrangements , and they should 
therefore be settled-to the extent such questions are ever set­
tled-as soon as possible.  
Those whose doubts spring from the language of the Con­
stitution,  and in particular references to ' ' the Senate, ' ' 2 1 1  should 
consider that the Constitution 's  grant of original jurisdiction to 
"the supreme Court "2 1 2 has not been thought to foreclose the 
delegation of even more extensive powers to one not a member 
of that body . 2 1 3 They should also hesitate before attempting 
distinctions based on familiar labels , each of which seems to fall 
off the impeachment process as soon as it is applied . 2 1 4 
Heflin ,  The Impeachment Process] . "This delegation of authority by the Senate was not 
without its critics .  In fact almost a third of the Senate voted to take testimony on the 
Senate floor." 1 32 CoNG. REc. S 16,788 (daily ed . Oct. 1 6 ,  1 986) (statement of Sen . 
Dole) . See id. at S 1 5 ,762-73 (statement of Sen . Bingaman) ; infra note 2 1 0. 
209 In denying Judge Claiborne's  motion for a temporary restraining order against 
the Senate, after it had voted not to hear additional witnesses, see supra note 208 , infra 
note 2 10, Judge Harold Greene observed: 
It is unfortunate in a way that evidence on impeachment was taken 
through a committee for the first time, apparently, in the history of the 
republic . . . .  
But the question is not whether I ,  or any other judge, would have 
organized the impeachment process and impeachment procedure the way it 
was organized in this instance this month, but the question is whether this 
court has the authority to interfere with the choice made by the Senate. In  
my judgment, the answer is clearly no. 
Claiborne v.  United States Senate, No. 86-2780 (D.D.C. Oct . 8, 1 986) (transcript of 
proceedings), printed in CLAIBORNE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL, supra note 1 88 ,  at 1 90-91 ;  see 
Roberts, Claiborne Ousted from U. S. Bench After Senate Vote, Los Angeles Daily J . ,  
Oct. 1 0, 1 986, at I ,  col. 6.  
210 See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 3 5 ,  at 1 69-73;  C. BLACK, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 1 2  
("of dubious constitutionality"); cf. Heflin ,  The Impeachment Process, supra note 208 , 
at 1 24 (questioning whether Senate proceedings in Claiborne trial "were in accordance 
with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment"). Judge Claiborne moved to declare 
Senate Rule XI unconstitutional and for a trial before the entire Senate. 1 32 CoNG. REc . 
S 1 5 ,485 (daily ed . Oct . 7 ,  1 986) . Those motions were effectively denied when the Senate 
passed, by a vote of 6 1 -32, Senator Dole's motion that additional witnesses not be heard. 
1 32 CoNG. REC. S 1 5 , 557 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1 986) . 
1 2 .  
2 1 1  U.S. CoNST. art . I ,  § 3 ,  quoted supra note 1 ;  see C. BLACK, supra note 1 1 7 ,  at 
' 1 '  U.S.  CoNST. art . I I I ,  § 2, cl . 2.  
2 1 3  See Williams, supra note 1 98 ,  at 578-80. 
2 14  See Goldstein, supra note 206, at 8 1- 10 1 ;  Williams, supra note 1 98 ,  at 574-78, 
582-86. 
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Those whose doubts are reinforced by suppositions as  to the 
intent of the framers-who,  after all , contemplated a smaller 
Senate and lived in less complicated if not less interesting times­
should simply reconsider . English practice permitted the use of 
committees by the H ouse of Lords (in a process to which the 
"criminal" label might stick) , 2 1 5 and Jefferson specifically re­
ferred to that practice in the manual he prepared as President 
of the Senate between 1 797 and 1 80 1 . 2 16 
But again , this is not a question that requires extensive 
original investigation.  Having benefited from the thorough anal­
yses of others , I harbor no serious doubts about the constitu­
tionality of the Senate ' s  use of a committee in the Claiborne 
matter . Those who do should read the existing literature2 17 and 
demonstrate the respects ,  if  any, in which it is wanting.  In the 
process , they may also want to address arguments to the effect 
that the Senate could constitutionally, and perhaps should in 
some cases , go further than Rule XI presently permits , as by 
using masters and/or authorizing its delegate(s) to  make recom­
mendations that would assist Senators in resolving questions of 
credibility . 2 1 8 
Simply as a matter of  policy , I would not advocate the 
Senate' s  use of a committee "to receive evidence and to take 
testimony" in a trial on articles impeaching a president , a vice-
2 1 5 See supra text accompanying notes 1 10,  1 1 6 .  
2 16 See H . R .  Doc. No. 279, supra note 1 68 ,  at 299. In arguing against the use of 
masters by the Senate, as proposed by Professor Stolz (Stolz, Disciplining Federal Judges: 
Is Impeachment Hopeless? ,  57 CALIF. L .  REv. 659, 660, 664 ( 1 %9)), Professor Berger 
invokes one part of Jefferson's Manual , see R. BERGER, supra note 3 5 ,  at 1 7 1 -72, but, 
incredibly, does not mention the reference to committees . See Goldstein,  supra note 206, 
at 1 5 3 .  
Doubters should also consider the limited powers o f  a committee appointed under 
Rule XI, see supra text accompanying notes 203-06, and the march of technology. The 
taking of evidence by the Senate Committee in the Claiborne matter was videotaped. See 
1 32 CoNG. REc. S 1 5 ,487 (daily ed.  Oct . 7 ,  1 986) (statement of Manager H ughes) . 
2 17 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 1 98 ;  see also Memorandum of Defendants in 
Opposition to Application for a Temporary Restraining Order, Claiborne v. United States 
Senate, No. 86-2780 (D.D.C .  1 986) , printed in CLAIBORNE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL, supra 
note 1 88 ,  at 223-55 ;  1 32 CoNG. REc . S 1 6,350-53 (daily ed. Oct. 1 5 ,  1 986) (statement of 
Sen. Mathias). 
219 .  
2 18  See, e.g., Stolz, supra note 2 16 ;  Williams, supra note 198 ;  see also infra note 
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president , or a j ustice of the Supreme Court .  2 1 9  Moreover , al­
though a 1 986 amendment to Rule XI permits a committee of 
any size (including, I suppose,  one), 220 I would not advocate 
reducing the size below twelve when the Senate will find facts 
as an original proposition . That is not because of any mystical 
attachment to a number associated with a j ury, although the 
analogy may explain the reference in the rule as added in 1 93 5 .  
O n  the contrary, recognizing that the impeachment process is 
peculiarly a political process ,  my policy preference springs from 
the view that senators considering the transcript of proceedings 
before a committee should have some assurance that d ecisions 
as to the conduct of those proceedings were made by a group 
large enough to approximate differences in the Senate as a 
whole .22 1 Obviously, this consideration would loom even larger 
if the Senate were to empower committees appointed under Rule 
XI to make recommendations , whether as to the facts that 
should be found or, in addition,  the conclusions that should be 
drawn from them .222 
That the Senate did end up finding the facts in the Claiborne 
trial as an original proposition came about , as it were , by 
default . In authorizing the appointment of a committee under 
Rule XI , the Senate had directed that all evidence be g athered 
before the Senate convened as a whole. 223 Before the Committee, 
the House managers moved that the Senate grant summary 
219 Senator Hoar's  1 904 proposal excluded the President, Vice-President, and any 
person acting as president. 38 CoNG. REc. 3992 (1 904). A similar proposal by Senator 
(later Justice) Sutherland during the impeachment trial of Judge Archbald would have 
excepted the impeachment trials of ' ' the President or Vice-President of the United States, 
a member of the Cabinet, or a member of the Supreme Court of the United States ."  49 
CoNG. REc. 698 ( 1 91 2) .  This proposal would have permitted the Judiciary Committee to 
take testimony and to make advisory findings of fact. See id. ; cf Goldstein, supra note 
206, at 1 56 (" [T]he Senate trial envisioned for a presidential impeachment by Hamilton 
in Federalist 65 would not be consistent with extensive use of masters.") .  
220 1 32 CoNG. REc. S 1 1 ,902 (daily ed .  Aug. 1 5 ,  1 986); see supra note 202 . 
221 Cf Sperlich, " . . .  And Then There Were Six: The Decline of the American 
Jury," 63 JUDICATURE 262 ( 1 980) (criticizing Supreme Court decisions regarding jury size 
and unanimity for ignoring or misusing empirical evidence regarding such matters as the 
effect of size on group performance, group productivity, and representativeness) . 
= This would require amending Rule XI.  See supra text accompanying note 206. 
223 See S.  Res . 48 1 ,  99th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  ( 1 986) ; 1 32 CoNG. REc. S i 1 ,673 (daily ed. 
Aug. 14, 1 986) . 
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disposition of article I I I , 224 that the Senate apply collateral es­
toppel to articles I and I I ,  225 and that the Senate convene to 
consider those motions before they became moot as a result of 
the committee ' s proceedings . 226 After the committee had met in 
closed session , the chair denied the last of these motions, invok­
ing his views on the merits as reason not to " disturb (] the 
Senate ' s  careful decision that this committee receive the parties ' 
evidence prior to the Senate's  consideration of the legal and 
factual merits of the articles . " 227 Because the committee lacked 
the power to dispose of an article of impeachment or to make 
findings of fact , the first two motions were probably doomed 
before the Senate . 228 
For the future,  the Senate as a whole should address and 
make provision in its rules for at least some of the questions 
that arose in the Claiborne trial but that existing limitations on 
the powers of a committee appointed under Rule XI and an 
interpretation of the specific charge to the Claiborne committee 
kept from full ventilation.  Anticipating that discussion , I would 
urge that summary disposition of an impeachment article is  never 
appropriate for the reasons advanced above in my discussion of  
article III  as  approved by the  House. 229 As  I have also indicated , 
there is much to be said for granting substantial preclusive effect 
to the findings of fact necessarily grounding a guilty verdict , at 
least when the judgment of conviction has been affirmed on 
appeal and so long as those involved in the impeachment process 
224 See REPORT oF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL CoMMITTEE , supra note 72, at 
43,  44. 
215 See id. at 43 , 5 1 -53 .  
226 See id. at  43-44. 
227 !d. at 109 .  
228 See id. at 44; S .  REP .  No. 5 1 1 ,  supra note 188 ,  at 2 .  This was the view of the 
House managers, but the problem was not precisely one of mootness . Rather, once a 
committee of 1 2  Senators had taken evidence, it was unlikely that the Senate as a whole 
would choose to ignore the product of its efforts, although it retained the right to do so.  
See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 1 08 .  In 
any event, the House withdrew its  motions before the full Senate. 1 32 CoNG. REc . 
S 1 5 ,279 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1 986) (remarks of Sen . Simpson) . The Senate ultimately failed 
to convict on article I I I .  See supra text accompanying note 193 .  
229 See supra text accompanying notes 1 89-94. The Senate's failure to convict on 
article III probably serves as a sufficiently clear precedent to obviate the need for a rule 
on this issue. See supra text accompanying note 193 .  I am, of course, assuming a contested 
article of impeachment. 
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consider claims of error regarding the antecedent fact-finding 
process that have not previously been rej ected by the courts . 230 
Perhaps, however , one should distinguish for these purposes 
between the role o f  the House and the role of the Senate . Some 
measure of efficiency can be achieved in the Senate process by 
admitting evidence previously admitted in the criminal proceed­
ings . 23 1 Efficiency is not , in any event , the most important value .  
At the same time, i t  i s  not clear how according preclusive effect 
to fact-finding in the circumstances described could plausibly be 
deemed unfair or inconsistent with the exercise by the Senate of 
its unique constitutional duty, which in these circumstances would 
seem to have less to do with fact-finding than with the charac­
terization of the facts under the constitutionally prescribed sub­
stantive standard. 232 
230 See supra text accompanying notes 1 78-88; see also supra note 228 and accom­
panying text. 
231 See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL CoMMITTEE, supra note 72, at 
1 10- 1 1  (granting House motions to admit trial testimony and exhibits and to accept prior 
admissions); S. REP . No. 5 1 1 ,  supra note 1 88 ,  at 2 .  
m Senator Mathias' argument to  the contrary should be evaluated with the knowl­
edge that he was addressing not only the House's motion to give preclusive effect to facts 
found in Judge Claiborne's criminal trial but also the motion to grant summary disposition 
to article I I I .  See REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE, supra note 
72, at 1 09- 1 0; supra text accompanying notes 222-27 . As to the latter motion, I agree 
with the Senator. See supra text accompanying note 229. As to preclusion, however, I 
am not persuaded by invocation of Hamilton's reference to "the double security intended 
them by a double trial ."  THE FEDERALIST No.  65, supra note 42, at 20. Hamilton was 
there justifying the framers' choice of the Senate instead of the Supreme Court to try 
impeachments, and he assumed (if he did not assume that the Constitution required, see 
supra text accompanying note I l l ) that the impeachment trial would be held first. 
Moreover, he assumed that a Supreme Court justice would preside at the subsequent 
(criminal) trial and, were the constitutional arrangements otherwise, might infect a jury 
with his or her bias conceived from presiding at the impeachment trial. See 2 Farrand, 
supra note 34, at 500 .  Whatever the force of this reasoning on Hamilton's assumptions, 
it hardly seems applicable to the question under discussion . 
Senator McConnell has offered some additional , quite practical, arguments in favor 
of the course taken in the Claiborne trial, including concern about the possibility that 
the criminal conviction might have been reversed and about the creation of a precedent 
that "could estop the Senate from [removing] an official for improprieties on which he 
had been acquitted for narrow technical reasons . "  McConnell, supra note 1 96, at 748 . I 
have addressed the first concern. See supra text accompanying notes 1 82-84.  The second 
is a red herring. As noted above, it is important to distinguish between the facts necessarily 
found (or issues necessarily determined) in the criminal proceeding and the result of that 
proceeding . It is also important to identify the purposes of the respective proceedings and 
the allocation and quantum of the burden of persuasion. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
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The experience of the committee appointed in the Claiborne 
trial revealed other respects in which the existing rules , whatever 
their suitability for trials " in open Senate , "  are ill adapted to a 
smaller group . A number of those rules are instinct with the 
limitations of proceedings before the full Senate. 23 3  Some o f  
them were honored more in the breach than the observance by 
the Claiborne committee . 234 A fresh look at the Senate ' s  rules 
should include discrete attention to a subset of rules applicable 
in, and only in, proceedings before a committee of less than the 
whole . 
The transcript of the proceedings of the Claiborne committee 
tends to confirm , on the other hand, the Senate' s wisdom in 
refusing thus far to adopt detailed rules of evidence for impeach­
ment trials . Moreover , it suggests that ,  in revising the rules , the 
Senate should avoid the temptation o f  borrowing wholesale the 
Federal Rules of Evidence .235 Even in the absence o f  a formally 
applicable body of evidence rules , the participants in the Clai-
JUDGMENTS, supra note 1 82,  at § 85 and comment g ("Effect of Criminal Judgment in  
Subsequent Civil Proceeding").  
233 See, e.g., Senate Rule XVI (requiring motions, objections, requests, or applica­
tions by parties or counsel to be addressed to presiding officer and empowering the latter 
or any senator to require that they be committed to writing) ; Senate Rule XIX (senator's 
questions and motions must be reduced to writing and put by presiding officer, and 
senators may not engage in colloquy). 
234 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL COMMITTEE ,  supra note 
72, at 46 (question by Sen. Hatch), 643-45 (questions by Sen . Heflin) .  Perhaps because 
the chairman's reminder of the restrictions imposed by Rule XIX, see id. at 482, had not 
been successful, the Senate granted the chairman authority to waive its requirement that 
questions be put in writing and to establish terms and restrictions for questioning. 1 32 
CoN G. REc. S 12 ,779 (daily ed . Sept.  1 7 ,  1 986). But Senators continued to ask questions 
without first being recognized, see, e.g., REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL 
CoMMITTEE , supra note 72, at 847 (Sen. Heflin); colloquy was not uncommon, see id. at 
779-80, 873-78, and it is not clear that Rule XIX's requirement that motions be put in 
writiqg was ever observed . See, e.g. , id. at 779 (Sen . Warner & Sen. Rudman), 9 1 6  (Sen . 
Warner), 956-57 (Sen. Heflin), 963 (Sen . Bingaman), 1 087-88 (Sen. Heflin).  
Notwithstanding the restricted role o f  the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee, see 
id. at 29, 109,  some members commented at length on the credibility of  a witness. See 
id. at 1 104-05 (statements of Sen. Rudman, Sen . DeConcini, & Sen. Gore) . 
m Compare REPORT OF THE SENATE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL CoMMITTEE, supra note 
72, at 20 (Sen. Hatch recommends following the Federal Rules of Evidence) with id. at 
2 1  (Sen . Gore argues that the Committee should not be bound by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence) . Senator Hatch and Senator Gore agreed that the Committee could do what it 
wished in this regard, and the matter was not specifically resolved. 
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borne proceeding were alert to evidentiary questions . 236 It is not 
hard to imagine a trial governed by a detailed body of  rules 
becoming bogged down in technical disputes , with the ascertain­
ment of facts the victim . Particularly when one imagines a trial 
"in open Senate , "  the dangers of distraction are daunting . 
The Senate appears always to have followed rules of evidence 
in impeachment trials , 237 and it should continue to follow those 
that are deemed fundamental . To the extent that opinions differ 
about what are the fundamental rules today ,  to provide guidance 
to those preparing for trial , and to avoid disputes at trial , it 
would be sensible to formulate a few broad and general rules .238 
The sources mentioned previously discuss these matters in con­
siderable detai l , 239 and I will add only a few words .  
Relevance remains the cornerstone of  modern evidence law , 240 
and it is an imperative for impeachment trials as much as for 
any other trial . Hearsay , if by that word we intend the elaborate 
and largely irrational system accreted over two centuries of  
distrust for j uries , 24 1 is not a cornerstone of  anything except the 
incomes of law professors . Trustworthiness and necessity should 
be the dominant considerations in the Senate's decision whether 
to admit relevant evidence that is hearsay according to whatever 
test is accepted.  242 According to this view, the fact that evidence 
would be admissible under a long-recognized exception to the 
hearsay rule would not be determinative ,  as it apparently now 
236 See, e.g., id. at 70-74, 1 10- 1 1 ,  5 36-37, 539-4 1 ,  544, 547, 560, 565-66, 568-69, 574-
75,  577, 580, 595, 597-98, 607 , 609- 12 ,  6 1 6- 1 7 ,  657, 659, 660, 664-65,  667, 67 1 ,  676, 676-
77, 680-8 1 ,  692-93, 696-97 , 755, 759, 773 , 776, 826-29, 840, 847 , 848, 862, 884-85 ,  905-
06, 9 1 2, 9 1 6- 17 ,  929, 948-5 1 ,  963 , 1 01 4 , 1 0 1 6, 1 085-86, 1 097, 1 1 7 1 ,  l l 83-84. 
231 See IMPEACHMENT, SELECTED MATERIALS ON PROCEDURE, supra note 45, at 243-
3 4 1 ' 789-93 . 
238 Cf supra text accompanying notes 1 70-73 (arguments for presumptively applicable 
rules to govern House impeachment inquiry). 
239 See Goldstein, Memorandum IV on Rules of Evidence for Senate Impeachment 
Trials, in IMPEACHMENT: MISCELLANEOUS DocUMENTS, supra note 1 4 1 ,  at 239; Firmage & 
Mangrum, supra note 1 67,  at 1 059-6 1 ,  1062-78 ;  Futterman, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 12- 1 8 .  
240 See FED. R .  Evm . 40 1 -402. 
241 See, e.g., Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 HARv. L .  
REV . 1 786 ( 1979-80) . 
242 Cf Goldstein , supra note 239, at 255-8 1 ;  id. at 276 (concluding that "there are 
good reasons for not holding the Senate strictly to judicial hearsay rules") .  
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is for purposes of rej ecting a claim under the sixth amendment , 243 
although it would usually be sufficient . Similarly , the fact that 
such an exception could not be found would not always require 
exclusion if, evaluated discretely , the evidence were deemed highly 
trustworthy and there was need for it because o f  the unavail­
ability of other comparably probative evidence . 
Finally , if the Senate does revise its rules for impeachment 
trials , it should avoid the temptation of other transplants besides 
the Federal Rules o f  Evidence, in particular the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. One of the reasons , although not the primary 
reason, the Senate' s  1 974 effort yielded such meager changes in 
the rules was that the only concrete proposal the Committee on 
Rules considered was hopelessly misdirected . That proposal , put 
forward by Senator Mansfield /44 attempted to dress an impeach­
ment trial in the clothes of a federal civil action .245 Those clothes 
do not fit comfortably . 246 Some borrowing may be appropriate,  
but it  will necessarily be  highly selective.  For the rest , the clothes 
must be custom-mad e ,  although even custom-made clothes may 
draw inspiration from those that are mass-produced . 
I I I .  ALTERNATIVES TO CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS: GENERAL 
CON SID ERA TIONS 
My primary concerns in this Essay have been to urge that 
Congress proceed with care and thoroughness i n  considering 
whether to initiate the process of changing the arrangements for 
removing federal judges that are prescribed by the Constitution , 
that it view those arrangements in the context b oth o f  our 
tripartite system of government and of all of society 's  defenses 
against the excesses o f  l ife tenure , and that its comparative 
243 See Bourjaily v. United States , 1 07 S .  Ct. 2775 ,  2782-83 ( 1987). Professor Gold­
stein noted possible constraints, analogous to those imposed by the sixth amendment, on 
complete relaxation of hearsay rules in Senate trials .  See Goldstein, supra note 239, at 
280-8 1 .  
244 See Senate Rules, supra note 2 1 ,  at 1 7 1 -234. 
24 5  See, e.g., id. at 223-25 (Rule 5-Pleadings); id. at 225-26 (Rule 6-Conference and 
Trial Order); id. at 226-27 (Rule 7-Discovery) . Senator Mansfield also borrowed from the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, but less extensively. See id. at 1 7 3 ,  202 , 2 1 3 .  
246 See, e. g., id. at 29 (Sen . Thurmond criticizes proposal regarding discovery); id. 
at 83 (Sen. Helms suggests that proposal regarding amendment of articles is unconstitu­
tional) ;  id. at 200 (Sen . Stennis agrees with Sen . Helms) .  
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assessment include the costs and the benefits of current arrange­
ments as they might be adj usted with fidelity to the Constitution .  
This i s  not the place for a detailed analysis of alternatives to  
current arrangements that might be implemented by constitu­
tional amendment . A few general observations may, however , 
be helpful.  
The more ambitious of the proposed constitutional amend­
ments introduced during or after the Claiborne affair differ in 
a number of respects , but they share one fatal defect . They 
would empower Congress to prescribe by legislation either the 
process leading to removal or the substantive standard for re­
moval or both . Such open-ended proposals constitute " an invi­
tation to domination of one branch of government by another 
that should be no more acceptable today than it was to the 
framers 200 years ago . "  247 
One of the constitutional amendments proposed in response 
to recent developments provides : 
The Congress shall have the power by appropriate legislation 
to set  standards and guidelines by which the Supreme Court 
may discipline j udges appointed pursuant to Article I I I  who 
bring disrepute on the Federal courts or the administration of  
j ustice by the courts . Such discipline may include removal from 
office and diminution of compensation .248 
Another of the proposed constitutional amendments would em­
power Congress ' 'to provide procedures for the removal from 
office of Federal judges serving pursuant to Article I I I  of the 
Constitution, found to have committed treason, bribery , or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors . "249 
Assuming that these proposals should be taken at face value 
(not as mere vehicles for developing specifics to be embodied in 
revised proposals) ,250 they are obj ectionable without reference to 
specifics their sponsors may have had in mind . As to the first 
of them, 
247 Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22. 
248 S .J .  Res . 370, 99th Cong . ,  2d Sess .  ( 1 986) (introduced by Sen .  DeConcini) .  
m S.J .  Res .  1 1 3 ,  I OOth Cong . ,  1 st Sess . ( 1987) (introduced by Sen . Heflin for 
himself, Sen . Shelby, Sen . Stevens, and Sen. Sanford) . 
250 See supra text following note 67; infra note 252. 
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w e  would be foolish to give Congress a blank check ' ' to set 
standards and guidelines " for the discipline (including the re­
moval) of  federal j udges . . . .  It i s  no answer that . . .  the 
Supreme Court w o uld be the instrument of Congress for these 
purposes . For , passing the burdens under which the Court 
presently labors , it would be bound by the constitutional 
amendment and implementing legislation and would have only 
as much leeway to " maintain the independence of the j udicial 
branch " as the legisl ation afforded . 
Nor is it a comfort that the legislation would b e  c abined 
by a constitutional standard of bringing " disrepute on the 
Federal courts or the administration of  j ustice by the courts . "  
The capacity of the standard to lead to mischief is  well docu­
mented in the debates and deliberations that preceded the 
passage of the 1 980  Act . Finally, even if we were willing to 
trust future Congresses to adhere to a principle of generality 
in enacting implementing legislation,  we should be concerned 
about another danger:  the threat that open-ended disciplinary 
standards and procedures pose to the i ndependence of individ­
ual federal j udges .25 1  
The second proposal at least would perpetuate the current con­
stitutional standard, but it is otherwise open-ended and for that 
reason unacceptable . 252 
Assuming that any proposed constitutional amendment mer­
iting serious consideration would be sufficiently specific as to 
both process and substantive standards to permit informed judg­
ment on its likely costs and benefits , how should Congress assess 
proposed alternatives? 
First , Congress should avoid re-inventing the wheel . The 
legislative history of the 1 980 Act , which for present purposes 
is a history of more than a decade of hearings and reports,  
includes substantial information about other systems of j udicial 
discipline, in particular those used in the states . 253 Although the 
251 Burbank, Politics and Progress, supra note 62, at 22 (footnotes omitted) . 
252 In fact, it appears that Sen . Heflin has a particular alternative in mind. See 
Heflin, The Impeachment Process, supra note 208 , at 125 ("I  am currently in the process 
of drawing up legislation to implement my proposed constitutional amendment. This 
legislation would create a Judicial Inquiry Commission and a Court of the Judiciary .") .  
253 See H.R.  REP . No. 1 3 1 3 , supra note 3 8 ,  at 2 -5 ;  Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 29 1 -
300. 
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published literature evaluating the operations of state systems in 
recent years is not very illuminating for this purpose,  254 that 
literature, together with other available data,  may prove helpful 
in testing Senator Heflin' s  recent claims as to the effectiveness 
of state systems and their adaptability to the federal system . 255 
Second , if  Congress concludes that change is necessary in 
the current arrangements for removing federal judges , it should 
consider whether the new arrangements should be confined to 
that situation , as Senator Heflin ' s  proposal , although not his 
explanation of it, 256 suggests . The question necessarily implicates 
the effectiveness of the 1 980 Act in resolving problems that do 
not warrant removal , a question,  that ,  if Congress follows the 
course recommended here , will already have been addressed . 257 
I pose it because of two concerns . One is that a monolithic 
system of judicial discipline for the most trivial as well as the 
most serious offenses seems likely to be shaped with the latter 
in mind . 258 Alerted to the costs of trans-substantive procedure in 
other contexts , 259 we should not quickly impose it on the sub­
stantive law of j udicial discipline . Put another way, we should 
not use a "hundred-ton gun"260 to kill a gnat . The second , and 
a related concern, is that the more adversarial any new (trans­
substantive) arrangements are ,  the more likely is the new system 
254 See, e.g., Moser, Populism, a Wisconsin Heritage: Its Effect on Judicial Account­
ability in the State, 66 MARQ. L. REv. 1 ( 1 982-83);  Shaman, State Judicial Conduct 
Organizations, 76 KY. L.J .  8 1 1  ( 1987-88) ; Stern, Is Judicial Discipline in New York State a 
Threat to Judicial Independence?, 7 PACE L. REv. 291 ( 1 987); Wicker, A re Judges 
Receiving Due Process in Disciplinary Proceedings?, 22 JUDGES J .  35 (Spring 1 983) ;  
Comment, Judicial Misconduct in California, 1 1  SAN. FERN . V .L .  REv. 43 ( 1983-84) . 
255 See Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial, supra note 208 ; Heflin, The Impeachment 
Process, supra note 208 , at 1 25 .  Senator Heflin may be unaware that Congress did 
"examine the various ways in which the states remove judges , "  id. , prior to passing the 
1 980 Act . At least when the issue was use of those models for action short of removal, 
they were found inappropriate for transplant to the federal system. See, e.g. ,  H .R . REP . 
No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38,  at 3-5 ; Burbank, supra note 7 ,  at 29 1 -308; see also infra note 
268 . 
256 See Heflin, In Wake of Claiborne Trial, supra note 208;  Heflin, The Impeachment 
Process, supra note 208, at 1 24 .  
257 See supra text accompanying notes 58-65 , 76- 1 0 1 . 
258 Cf. supra note 1 70 (suggesting that House rules for Nixon impeachment inquiry 
may prove to be a mischievous precedent) .  
259 See, e.g. , Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 8 5  MrcH. L.  REv .  
1 463, 1 465 ,  1 474-76 ( 1 986-87).  
260 See supra text accompanying note 55 .  
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to discourage talented lawyers from aspiring to or  remaining on 
the federal bench . 261 I happen to believe that the 1 980 Act was 
necessary and that its faithful implementation by the federal 
judiciary is important . 262 But there is a limit to letting the exis­
tence of a " few bad apples" dictate health regulations ,  and 
given the present state of morale of the federal j udiciary, that 
limit is quickly reached . 
· 
Finally , although perhaps the first consideration for Con­
gress ,  any suggested alternative that is  found in another system 
should be analyzed in its context . What is the place of judicial 
independence in that system, and more generally , what is the 
place of the judiciary in the structure of government? To put a 
point on such inquiries , what comfort can those concerned about 
the federal system take from assurances that a j udicial discipline 
system has not diluted j udicial independence in a state whose 
judges are elected? 263 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns about efficient administration o f  the law are as 
pervasive as they are understandable . So ,  it may be,  is the 
tendency of institutional self-interest to shape conceptions of  
institutional mission,  particularly when, in serving its own inter­
ests , an institution can preserve or even augment its power . 264 
Constitutional amendment is , however , an expensive way to 
experiment with alternatives to current arrangements , and neither 
institutional self-interest nor institutional power i s  a compelling 
argument for change when those arrangements are designed to 
preserve the countervailing power of another institution .  
The removal o f  federal j udges is , I have argue d ,  a polycentric 
problem . Its wise resolution requires an anteced ent process of 
study and deliberation far more ambitious and p ainstaking than 
26' Cf. H . .  REP. No. 1 3 1 3 ,  supra note 38, at 3-4 (rejecting such arrangements for 
discipline short of removal) ; Burbank, supra note 7, at 306-07, 325 . On the problem of 
morale, see, e.g., R.  PosNER ,  THE FEDERAL CoURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 29-47 ( 1 985);  
Feinberg, The Coming Deterioration of the Federal Judiciary, 42 REc. A . B .  CITY N.Y.  
1 79 ( 1 987). 
262 See, e.g. ,  Burbank,  Politics and Progress, supra note 62. 
263 See R. WHEELER & A. LEVIN, supra note 66, at 14-27 , 59-6 1 ,  75-76. 
2 ""  See, e.g., Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, supra note 259. 
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proposals for this or that alternative are likely to elicit . In 
addition to advocating such a process in this Essay, I have 
attempted to suggest an analytical approach , to sketch the con­
tours of relevant inquiries , to put some questions to rest , and 
to raise others . Much research and analysis remains to be done.  
There is reason to hope that Congress will ensure that the task 
is pursued . 
" [I ]n the wake of the impeachment and removal of"265 Judge 
Claiborne, Senator Dole not only requested the Rules Committee 
to review the Senate rules for impeachment trials and urged the 
Senate Judiciary Committee "to give ·proposals for a constitu­
tional amendment early consideration. " 266 He also proposed the 
creation by statute of a "bipartisan Commission , supported by 
a National Advisory Committee , to investigate and study the 
constitutional problems of impeaching an Article I I I  j udge , and 
the advisability of  proposing an amendment to the Constitution 
regarding the possible impeachment of such judges . "267 In intro­
ducing the bill that would estab lish the commission and advisory 
groop , Senator Dole made clear his view that the matter requires 
' ' thorough and expeditious consideration, ' '  as well as his goal 
that the "ad hoc group " established by the resolution " explore 
the options of alternative remedies to impeachment and . . .  
fashion an appropriate amendment to  the Constitution.  " 268 Al­
though Senator Dole 's  proposal has languished in the Senate ,  it 
has been picked up and refined by Representative Kastenmeier 
in a bill recently introduced in the House . 269 
Senator Dole and Representative Kastenmeier have a good 
idea, although the former may underestimate the time that a 
commission would require for the work if expedition were not 
to overwhelm thoroughness .270 We have waited two hundred 
265 1 32 CONG. REc .  S 1 6,788 (daily ed . Oct . 1 6 , 1 986) . 
'66 !d. at S 16,789. 
267 S. 2934, 99th Cong. ,  2d Sess . § 2 ( 1 986); 1 32 CoNG. REc. S 1 6,789 (daily ed . Oct . 
1 6 ,  1 986). 
268 1 32 CoNG. REc. ,  supra note 267. Senator Dole is aware of the potential usefulness 
of the pre- 1 980 Act legislative record. See id.; supra note 255 . 
269 See H .R .  4393 , 1 00th Cong . ,  2d Sess . §§  201 - 10 ( 1 988) ; Kastenmeier, supra note 
93 , at 793-96. 
"0 See 1 32  CoNG. REc . supra note 267 (anticipating report of Commission "shortly 
after the next Congress begins its work") .  Representative Kastenmeier ' s  bill is more 
700 KENTUCKY LAW J OURNAL [VoL . 76  
years for a change, and ,  realistically, new arrangements could 
not be in place in time to deal with the matters that prompt 
present concerns . Whatever the future holds in the way of federal 
judges unfit to serve , we must ensure that the arrangements we 
make for them do not disable the federal judiciary as a whole . 
realistic, calling for a report by the proposed commission ' 'not later than one year after 
the date of its first meeting . "  H . R .  4393 , I OOth Cong . ,  2d Sess . § 208 ( 1 988). 
